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INTRODUCTION

Today, more than at any time in history, a business entity
chartered by one sovereign government is likely to operate within
the territory of a different sovereign government and to achieve
multiple layers of "citizenship" through pyramidal ownership
arrangements and corporate groups.
At the same time,
American courts are exercising the power to "disregard" or "look
through" the corporate form for more purposes than ever before,
utilizing veil-piercing doctrines that span procedural and
substantive law, common law and statutory law, and even
constitutional law. Modern veil piercing has sprinted past the
time-worn, archetypical case of shareholder liability for corporate
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debts as, increasingly, corporations attempt to self-pierce-to
enforce contracts executed by affiliated companies, or to reach
parent company coffers-as adversaries employ novel veilpiercing theories (for example, to compel discovery of documents
possessed by affiliated firms), and as courts evaluate corporate
ownership and control to determine the reach of their own
personal jurisdiction or the scope of a corporation's constitutional
rights.'
Yet the most fundamental questions about entity choice-oflaw remain unresolved. For example, when a business entity
appears in an American courtroom, which government's laws
govern its legal existence and powers? American courts have two
different answers to this question, depending on whether the
business entity was chartered domestically or abroad. Courts
will generally apply the entity law of the jurisdiction of
incorporation (lex incorporationis)to American firms, but not to
foreign firms.2 Where a corporation's juridical status is at stake,
American courts are weighing the policy arguments and
governmental interests that form the basis of this conflict-of-laws
analysis differently for domestic and foreign firms.
Most courts and commentators treat entity law questions as
if they fall within the scope of the "internal affairs doctrine," a
choice-of-law doctrine that applies to matters "peculiar to the
relationships among or between the corporation and its current
officers, directors, and shareholders"3 and rejects case-by-case
interest balancing in favor of a more predictable, and therefore
more economically-efficient, rule. Upon closer examination,
however, it is clear that a corporation's juridical status does not
fall within the scope of the internal affairs doctrine because it
concerns a corporation's external, rather than its internal,
affairs. And in practice, when American courts must choose a
government's entity laws to apply to a foreign corporation, these
courts are rejecting the lex incorporationisand applying the law
of an American state. Thus most American courts recognize

See infra pp. 933-34.
In this Article, I use the phrase "foreign corporation" to refer to any
corporation organized under the laws of a foreign government. Many state
legislatures and courts use the phrase to refer to corporations that are chartered by
other American states, but I am not adopting that definition.
3 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
2
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implicitly, if not explicitly, that choice-of-law questions about the
foreign corporate form do not truly implicate the internal affairs
doctrine.
Yet American courts and commentators have missed an
essential facet of the choice-of-law problem: In most cases, the
correct choice of law is federal law. This Article contends that
courts routinely ignore national governmental interests,
including United States foreign relations interests, when
addressing entity choice-of-law questions concerning companies
organized under the laws of foreign governments. It argues that
national interests, including economic policy interests in support
of international commerce, would be best served by uniform
federal veil-piercing standards, fashioned by federal judges with
the consent and supervision of Congress.
In advocating federal entity law standards for foreign firms,
this Article addresses the debate over the authority of the federal
courts to fashion federal common law. It finds the restrictive
theories that are currently popular with the legal academy
insufficient here, where federal interests strongly outweigh state
interests and where law has been judge-made by tradition and
practical necessity. Only federal institutions have a full scope of
lawmaking authority over entity law questions involving foreign
firms because the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state law
from distinguishing among entities chartered by different foreign
governments, or between American and foreign firms. Thus, in
practice, companies chartered by different foreign governments
enjoy the same legal "personhood" under the law of any
American state, regardless of differences between those foreign
governments' own entity laws. Moreover, the federal courts
already create and apply federal veil-piercing standards in
support of federal laws. They are thus well equipped to do so
more broadly. This Article argues that the entity laws that
define the legal status of foreign firms in American courts should
not be fashioned exclusively by parochial lawmaking
authorities-state courts and legislatures-that are hamstrung
The federal
by Dormant Commerce Clause constraints.
of
lawmaking
government, which uniquely possesses a full scope
options, and which has experience crafting federal veil-piercing
laws, should be the primary lawmaker.
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Importantly, the United States has signed bilateral
commercial treaties with many foreign nations that address
issues of corporate juridical personhood, essentially "federalizing"
Exceptions to these
the matter for covered companies.'
companies' treaty-mandated juridical status must be determined
Entity law for foreign firms involves
under federal law.
intersecting foreign commerce and foreign relations interests,
areas that the Constitution commits to the federal government.
And national economic interests favor a uniform national
approach. A choice-of-law regime that applies American state
law to foreign entities creates agency costs because a foreign firm
will not know which state's law applies to it. The very nature of
the problem, and the constitutional and economic interests at
stake, require a federal solution.
The issue of which jurisdiction's law should define the
identity of foreign corporations in American courts relates to one
of the most important and enduring questions in modern
American law: Can businesses evade laws simply by the act of
strategic

incorporation?

Erie Railroad Co.

v.

Tompkins'

addressed this issue for interstate incorporation, but the last
chapter in the Swift-Erie story-the chapter addressing strategic
incorporation at a global level-has not yet been written. This
Article contends that federal institutions should play the
dominant role in determining the ability of foreign entities to
enforce legal norms-such as contractual rights, constitutional
rights, and limited liability-in their favor in American courts.
And the best way to accomplish this is to consolidate authority
over the foreign corporate form in the federal institution that,
time and again, finds itself on the front line of defining it: the
federal courts.
Part I of this Article establishes the significance of choice-ofentity-law analysis in our twenty-first-century legal system by
exploring the breadth and variety of judicial doctrines in which
American courts disregard the corporate form. Legal scholars
See infra Part IV.B.1. As discussed in more detail in Part IV.B.1 below, this
Author has not found a single case in which a litigant has argued that a treaty
was relevant to a veil-piercing choice-of-law determination. Not only are these
commercial treaties relevant to veil-piercing choice-of-law for companies chartered
by treaty signatories, however, but where they apply, the treaties can change the
choice of law outcome. See infra Part IV.B.1.
5 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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tend to dismiss veil piercing as a narrow issue about shareholder
liability, but a corporation's status as a legal entity separate from
its owners is an essential-and much-litigated-issue in a very
wide scope of legal areas. By establishing the widespread
importance of analyses that disregard or look through the
corporate form, this Part shows that veil-piercing choice-of-law is
more significant than is generally understood.
Part II describes the basic choice-of-law regime for questions
about the juridical status of domestic firms. It shows that most
state and federal courts assume that the law of the state of
incorporation applies to veil-piercing claims for domestic
corporations, regardless of what sort of veil-piercing analysis is
involved-with the exception ofjurisdictional veil-piercing.
Part III contrasts the approach for domestic firms with the
approach for foreign firms. It shows that when questions about
the juridical status of foreign business entities arise, courts
occasionally discuss the internal affairs doctrine and choice-oflaw principles that favor the law of the jurisdiction of
incorporation, but they rarely apply foreign entity law. Part III
also looks briefly at the rise of treaty-chartered entities, a
category of stateless or supranational foreign entities that
confound traditional entity choice-of-law analysis. Finally, Part
III asks why the double standard exists, and it concludes that the
unsound basis for the domestic rule, coupled with practical
problems with applying lex incorporationis to foreign entities,
have led courts to reject the application of the law of the foreign
chartering jurisdiction for foreign firms.
Part IV offers a critique of the current state/foreign choice-oflaw regime. It argues that the existence of different approaches
for domestic and foreign firms effectively discriminates against
foreign firms and creates agency costs for those firms that put
them at an economic disadvantage. It contends that a rule that
favors balancing domestic state interests is no improvement,
because it potentially subjects foreign firms to fifty or more veilpiercing standards while domestic entities continue to enjoy the
benefits of having only a single jurisdiction's veil-piercing laws
apply to them. Finally, it explains why the potential for a global
entity law "race to the bottom" is real and must be guarded
against.
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Part V argues that the recognition or disregard of the
juridical status of foreign corporations is a matter of federal law.
It addresses the current debate about the legitimacy of federal
common law and shows why the debate cuts in favor of federal
judge-made entity law standards for foreign firms. It shows how
the United States has signed many bilateral treaties that directly
address the juridical "personhood" of foreign entities, effectively
federalizing the issue for companies covered by these treaties. It
also finds that by committing matters of foreign relations and
foreign commerce to the federal government, the Constitution
gives strong support to federal entity law for foreign firms. And
it argues that the federal government has a significant interest
in fashioning uniform, federal veil-piercing standards for foreign
firms, to facilitate international commerce and to establish
federal authority in an increasingly important area in which
state laws have traditionally reflected parochial state interests,
and have been limited by the Dormant Commerce Clause.
I.

ENTITY LAW FUNDAMENTALS

Legislatures create corporations and define their juridical
status but, in the American legal tradition, judges make the rules
by which they will reject a corporation's juridical status.' No
state has enacted comprehensive legislation to instruct its judges
when and how to pierce the corporate veil.' So basic is the
equitable power of courts to disregard the corporate form in our
legal system that the Supreme Court recently suggested in dicta
that judge-made veil-piercing law stands as a "background
principle[]" against which Congress legislates.'
6

See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76

CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1041 (1991) ("Almost all state corporations statutes simply

ignore the whole idea of piercing the corporate veil.").
7 In 1989, Texas's legislature responded to a controversial judicial veil-piercing
decision by codifying certain exceptions to traditional, judge-made veil-piercing
standards, but it otherwise left both the primary role of judges in defining the
standard and the remaining aspects of the judge-made standard intact. See TEX.
BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.107 (West 20111) (excepting shareholders from liability
"by disregarding the separate existence of the corporation," even where corporate
formalities are not observed); id. § 21.223 (limiting shareholders' liability for
contractual obligations on the basis of actual or constructive fraud).
' Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009). Veil-piercing
is an equitable doctrine in which a court decides whether it can fairly enforce an
aspect of juridical personhood under the specific circumstances of the controversy
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The archetypical veil-piercing case involves a contract or tort
claim in which a plaintiff seeks to hold a shareholder or corporate
parent liable for corporate debts via judge-made exceptions to
statutory limited liability.' In fact, when most corporate law
scholars speak of veil piercing, they are referring exclusively to
issues of shareholder or corporate parent liability. 0 But there
are many other types of cases in which courts will "lift" or "look
behind" the corporate veil by disregarding an entity's status as
legally separate from its shareholders or corporate parents. They
include many common-law doctrines, such as:
When, in contract law, a court applies an "alter ego"
principle to bind a shareholder or parent corporation

before it. The use of the word "veil" in the veil-piercing metaphor was probably
derived from a maxim of equity that held that "[elquity regards substance rather
than form." NORMAN FETTER, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 23 (1895). A
leading equity treatise at the turn of the twentieth century explained that the
maxim meant that "[e]quity will in no case permit the veil of form to hide the true
effect or intent of the transaction." Id. at 23.
1 Today this sort of veil-piercing is in poor repute among legal academics, who
decry the doctrine's "extremely discretionary" nature and its "vagueness." STEPHEN
PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:1 (2011). Philip I. Blumberg has called
veil-piercing a "failure": "Rigid in its formulation and yielding great uncertainty in
any attempt to predict its outcome, 'piercing' has led to hundreds, if not thousands,
of irreconcilable cases in each year." Phillip I. Blumberg, The Transformation of
Modern CorporationLaw: The Law of Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 605, 61112 (2005). It is not difficult to find law professors who argue that courts should
abandon veil-piercing altogether. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil
Piercing,26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001); Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP.
L. 41, 50 (2000) (suggesting that veil-piercing doctrine should be replaced with a
"duty to sufficiently capitalize").
1oLiability veil-piercing can arise in several different procedural postures. One
is when a plaintiff sues a corporate insider on a veil-piercing claim; a second is when
a victorious plaintiff finds that a corporate defendant is judgment-proof and seeks to
add a corporate insider as a judgment debtor on a veil-piercing theory. In other
cases, a party may seek to have two or more entities that are controlled by the same
person or people treated as alter egos of each other, so that the plaintiff can reach
the assets of all controlled entities. See, e.g., D. Klein & Son, Inc. v. Good Decision,
Inc., 147 F. App'x. 195 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that two corporations controlled by the
same husband-and-wife team effectively operated as a single company, and thus
both were liable for breach of contract).
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to a contract it has not signed," or to enforce a
contract on behalf of a nonsignatory corporate "alter

ego;"12
* When an issue litigated by a corporation is held to be
res judicata against its shareholder or parent company
on an "alter ego" theory;"3
* When incorporation inserts a "nonconductor" into a
legal relationship so that, for example, the sole
shareholder of a one-person corporation does not stand
in the position of principal to an agent hired by the

corporation;14

* When a bankruptcy court combines the assets and
liabilities of separate but related legal entities as if
they constituted a single enterprise under the
bankruptcy doctrine of "substantive consolidation;"'"
* When, in a discovery dispute, a court finds that a
corporation controls a document that is in the
possession of an affiliated entity with which it has a
"strong interconnection;""

n See, e.g., Graves v. BP Am., Inc., 568 F.3d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 2009) (federal
common law of contracts); TNS Holdings, Inc. v. MKI Sec. Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 335, 340,
703 N.E.2d 749, 752, 680 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (1998) (setting forth the New York law
of contracts).
12 In a number of recent cases, a corporation has sought to pierce its own
corporate veil to enforce a noncompetition agreement between a different, affiliated
corporation and its employee. See PharMethod, Inc. v. Caserta, 382 F. App'x. 214,
219 (3d Cir. 2010) (suggesting that Pennsylvania law may allow a court to enforce a
noncompetition agreement on behalf of a nonsignatory "sister" corporation by
disregarding the corporate form); see also Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc. v.
Chiquita Brands Int'l Inc, 616 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (declining to
enforce a noncompetition agreement on behalf of a nonsignatory "sister"
corporation).
s See, e.g., Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1975).
14 See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 290-91 (2003) (holding that the sole
shareholder and president of a California real estate corporation was not vicariously
liable for a corporate employee's violation of the Fair Housing Act on an agency
theory).
1"See, e.g., In re Huntco, Inc., 302 B.R. 35, 40 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2003)
("[Bloth veil piercing and substantive consolidation involve disregarding separate
corporate structures.").
16 See, e.g., In re Global Power Equip. Group Inc., 418 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Del.
2009); see also Gerling Int'l Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 839 F.2d 131, 141 (3d Cir. 1988)
(stating that when two sister corporations act as one in the transaction giving rise to
the litigation, it may be presumed that there is control by one sister of the
documents in possession of the other).
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* When a party urges the corporate form to be
disregarded to hold the corporation liable for the debts
of the shareholder, or for some other reason, in an act
of "reverse veil-piercing;""
* When a corporation seeks to pierce its own corporate
veil to reach its parent company coffers;1 8
* When a corporation effectively denies its separate
legal personality in order to have a status of a parent
company attributed to it (or vice versa);"
* When a family court uses "veil-piercing" analysis to
determine whether corporate assets are part of the
community estate for purposes of calculating and
dividing the estate in divorce, where one spouse is a
shareholder in a corporation; 20 and
* When a court determines that, as a matter of law and
pursuant to the "intracorporate conspiracy doctrine," a
conspiracy cannot be accomplished solely by the
officers, managers, agents, and employees of a single
corporate entity.2 1

See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 971997
WL 357907, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[Tlhis is the unusual case where the
1217,
corporation is sought to be held to the actions of its shareholders"); Elham Youabian,
Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil: The Implications of Bypassing "Ownership"
Interest, 33 Sw. U. L. REV. 573, 577 (2004).
18 See, e.g., Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. GPU, Inc., 355 F. App'x 547 (2d Cir.
2009).
" See, e.g., Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp., v. Madias, 554 F. Supp. 375, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (declining to attribute Dutch parent company's "bank" status to its
Bermuda non-bank subsidiary), rev'd on othergrounds, 717 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1983).
20 For a discussion of Texas law regarding the doctrine of corporate entity and
divorce, see Lifshutz v. Lifshutz, 61 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to
disregard the corporate entity and distribute assets of corporation in a divorce
because the husband's conduct as C.E.O. did not reflect "egregious circumstances").
21 See, e.g., Solla v. Aetna Health Plans of N.Y. Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 252, 257
(E.D.N.Y. 1998). For many years, the Supreme Court also endorsed a rule that
parent and subsidiary corporations that were legally separate entities under state
corporate law could form a conspiracy under the Sherman Act. See Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951). In 1984, in a 5-3 split, the
Supreme Court renounced the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine on the rationale
that "substance, not form, should determine whether a separately incorporated
entity is capable of conspiring" under the Sherman Act. Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 n.21 (1984).
17
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Most states apply the same essential standards to this entire
range of common-law veil-piercing claims.2 2
Some state statutes also call for courts to disregard the
corporate form, either by express command or by implication."
Jurisdictional veil piercing, which may be authorized implicitly
or explicitly by a state's civil procedure laws, is one example.
Jurisdictional veil piercing includes two separate inquiries. One
occurs when a court asserts personal jurisdiction over an out-ofstate shareholder or parent company by imputing to it the
jurisdictional contacts of the corporation. 25 Another form of
jurisdictional veil piercing takes place when service of process on
a corporation's "alter ego" is held to effect service of process on
the corporation, or vice versa.26 In both types of jurisdictional
veil piercing, a court's decision to disregard the corporate form
means that it can assert jurisdiction over a party. If the
corporate form is not disregarded, there is no jurisdiction.27
22 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing:An Attempt To Lift the Veil
of
Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. Rev.
853, 856 (1997) (describing the widely-used "'template' approach" to veil-piercing);
see also supra notes 11-22.
2 See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
24 For another example of a state statute that commands a court to pierce the
corporate veil, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1212(c) (West 2011).
21 Under the alter-ego theory of personal jurisdiction, a corporation's alter-ego is
viewed as the same entity as the corporation itself, and the jurisdictional contacts of
one are imputed to the other. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc.,
387 F.3d 403, 412 n.7 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[plersonal jurisdiction may be established
over a corporate officer by establishing that the individual is an alter ego of a
corporation over which the district court has established personal jurisdiction");
Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 648-49 (8th Cir. 2003) (When the
defendant is a nonresident parent corporation, "personal jurisdiction can be based on
the activities of the nonresident corporation's in-state subsidiary, but only if the
parent so controlled and dominated the affairs of the subsidiary that the latter's
corporate existence was disregarded so as to cause the residential corporation to act
as the nonresidential corporate defendant's alter ego"); Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc.,
228 F.3d 1057, 1069 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[a]lthough jurisdiction over a subsidiary
does not automatically provide jurisdiction over a parent, where the parent totally
controls the actions of the subsidiary so that the subsidiary is the mere alter ego of
the parent, jurisdiction is appropriate over the parent as well") (citations omitted).
26 See, e.g., Transfield ER Cape Ltd. v. Indus. Carriers, Inc., 571 F.3d 221, 224
(2d Cir. 2009) (noting the "well-established New York law that 'service on the alter
ego of a corporation constitutes effective service on the corporation'" (quoting King
v. Galluzzo Equip. & Excavating, Inc., No. 00-CV-6247, 2001 WL 1402996, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2001)).
27 See Compaq Computer Corp., 387 F.3d at 412 n.7; Transfield ER Cape Ltd.,
571 F.3d at 224.
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Federal statutes are also regularly interpreted to permit or
require veil piercing. For example, ERISA's remedial provisions
entitle plaintiffs to enjoin conduct that violates the act and "to
Some federal
obtain other appropriate equitable relief."2 8
circuits, including the Second Circuit of the United States Court
of Appeals, have held that this authorizes the fashioning of
A more
federal veil-piercing standards specific to ERISA."
obscure example is the Trading with the Enemy Act 30 , which
allows the seizure of enemy-controlled property during wartime.3 1
The Act is silent about the corporate form, but the Supreme
Court has interpreted it to require veil piercing when the
corporation in question has enemy shareholders, in a search for
"enemy taint."32
Courts will also disregard the corporate form in analyzing
constitutional claims. 3 For example, in 2009, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a corporation that is
controlled by a foreign government cannot not claim Fifth
Amendment protections. 34 The Second Circuit fashioned its own
veil-piercing standard for such cases, rejecting Due Process
protections for any foreign business entity that is "so 'extensively
control[ed]'" by a foreign government "'that a relationship of
principal and agent is created.' "6 And the Supreme Court's

29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3) (West 2011).
See Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987)
("Neither the separate corporate status of the three corporations nor the general
principle of limited shareholder liability afford protection where exacting obeisance
to the corporate form is inconsistent with ERISA's remedial purposes.").
'0 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (2006).
See Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 55 F. Supp. 906, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
3 See Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G., 332 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1947).
" Jurisdictional veil-piercing is often an exercise of constitutional veil-piercing.
Most states' long-arm statutes extend personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent
permitted by the Due Process Clause, and thus jurisdictional veil-piercing is most
commonly a constitutional exercise running in one direction: The decision of a state
court to disregard the corporate form and extend personal jurisdiction over a
corporate insider will be overturned if the Constitution effectively protects their
separate identities. The Due Process Clause will not be invoked, however, on the
basis that the state law provides too strong a presumption in favor of corporate
separateness.
" See Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azerbaijan
Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 400 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco
Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626-27, 629, 632 (1983)).
28

29

35

Id.
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6
has
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission1

opened the floodgates to political speech cases in which the
identity of first amendment "speakers" within the corporationincluding shareholders, managers, employees, and creditorsmay help determine a corporation's First Amendment rights.
All of this suggests that veil piercing-the act of
disregarding or looking "through" the corporate form-has been
utilized by courts in an expanding body of legal doctrines that go
well beyond typical questions about shareholder or parent
company liability for corporate debts. Veil piercing occurs in
many different areas of law, and as corporate activity plays an
increasing role in the commercial and legal spheres, it is likely to
Veil piercing is a more
cross more doctrinal boundaries.
significant legal doctrine than is commonly understood, and thus
questions about veil-piercing conflicts-of-law should also be
understood as important to a wide scope of legal disputes, with
significant conceptual and practical implications.
The widespread use by courts of veil-piercing analyses also
suggests that it is a fundamental judicial function to lift the
corporate veil, if doing so will reveal the "true" substance of a
transaction or dispute. State legislatures, and Congress, have
consented to an entity law regime in which courts play this
important lawmaking role. There are many reasons that may
explain why courts are viewed as the right institution to develop
detailed veil-piercing doctrines, including (1) because veilpiercing standards, traditionally judge-made, constitute the legal
"background principles" upon which Congress legislates; 38
(2) because the doctrine is fact specific and turns on equitable
130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
' Constitutional veil-piercing arguably dates back to the early nineteenth
century and a line of cases concerning corporate "citizenship" for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction. See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 497, 499-500 (1844); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519
(1839), overruled as stated in Hughes v. A.H. Robins Co., 490 A.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 63-64 (1809), overruled as
stated in E. Say. Bank v. Walker, 775 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). A court's
choice to disregard the corporate form and take shareholders' identities into account
can implicate the constitutional rights of third parties as well, as the Supreme Court
found in 2009 when it held that a state court appellate judge violated due process by
failing to recuse himself in an appeal by a coal corporation whose chief executive
officer spent millions of dollars of his personal money to secure the judge's election.
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
" Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009).
36
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considerations that are best resolved case-by-case by judges;39
and (3) because legislatures respect the inherent power of the
judiciary to create doctrines that allow it to fulfill its basic
functions, such as recognizing and defining the parties that
appear before it.4 0 At any rate, it is a fact of American veilpiercing jurisprudence that courts make the veil-piercing laws
that apply across a very wide range of common law, statutory
analysis, and constitutional analysis, with rare legislative
intervention.
II. CHOICE OF ENTITY LAW FOR DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS

When the juridical status of a domestic firm is in question,
courts and commentators generally agree about which
jurisdiction's law should apply: the law of the state of
incorporation. This Part shows how this rule dominates choice of
law across American states and identifies the internal affairs
doctrine, a unique choice-of-law rule that applies exclusively to
corporations, as the main basis of the rule. It also finds two less
common bases for the rule: statutes in a small number of states
that require the application of the law of the chartering
jurisdiction in limited circumstances involving specific types of
veil piercing, and the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law,
which recommends the application of the law of the chartering
state for questions about "the existence and extent of a
shareholder's liability to ... its creditors for corporate debts."4 '
The general rule for domestic firms, and the exceptions to
the rule, highlight a fundamental tension in the way American
courts conceptualize the corporate form. On one hand, some
courts, such as the federal courts of the Southern District of New
York, seem close to adopting the contractarian view that the
corporate charter is a private contract and the jurisdiction of
incorporation is a choice of entity law by the parties to that

39 Commentators often remark that veil-piercing is a very fact-specific doctrine.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing,2005 U. ILL. L. Rev.
77, 77; Mark Wu, Comment, Piercing China's Corporate Veil: Open Questions from
the New Company Law, 117 YALE L.J. 329, 335 (2007).
"0See, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812) (inherent judicial powers exist "which cannot be dispensed with in a Court,
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others").
41

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 307

(1971).
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contract. 42 These courts tend to be particularly firm in applying
the veil-piercing law of the chartering state to domestic entities.
Some have gone so far as to hold that the court's own personal
jurisdiction over a business entity turns on the alter ego law of
its state of incorporation, a decision which can strip the state's
own legislature and courts of the power to determine the reach of
the state's long-arm jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations
and their shareholders.
On the other hand, most courts exempt jurisdictional veil
piercing from the general rule.4 4 And a number of courts,
particularly in tort cases involving injuries committed in-state,
have refused to apply the veil-piercing law of the state of
In these situations, by
incorporation to out-of-state firms."
asserting the power of the state to define the corporate form of
out-of-state firms for in-state purposes, courts implicitly reject
the private-contract theory of the corporation. Thus, the choiceof-law debate perfectly frames the unresolved conflict between
competing theories of the corporation's relationship with
government authority.

42 See infra note 91. Delaware is another such jurisdiction. See Morris v. Am.
Pub. Utils. Co., 122 A. 696, 700 (Del. Ch. 1923) ("That a corporate charter is a
contract has been long settled.").
4 See, e.g., Mega Tech Int'l Corp. v. Al-Saghyir Establishment, No. 96 CIV 8711
LBS, 1999 WL 269896, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1999).
" See infra note 89.
4 See infra notes 90-91.
46 Although the vast majority of American courts will apply the veil-piercing law
of the chartering state to American corporations, there are some exceptions to the
rule. The most important of these is jurisdictional veil piercing, in which most courts
apply the law of the forum state to out-of-state domestic firms. See infra note 89.
Less commonly, courts sometimes apply the veil-piercing law of the state where an
injury occurred in a tort case. Gregory Scott Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing
Litigation: Why Courts Should Discard the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace
General Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 85, 86 n.3 (2008).
And though, as a rule, courts hold that a contractual choice-of-law provision does not
influence veil-piercing choice of law, a small number of courts have held that a
contractual choice-of-law provision determines the choice of law for a veil-piercing
inquiry related to a contract. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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The "Well-Settled" Rule for Domestic Firms
Overwhelmingly, state courts apply the veil-piercing law of
the state of incorporation to out-of-state domestic companies. 7
This is because legal scholars and courts generally assume that
the internal affairs doctrine applies to veil piercing,48 and many
courts that apply the law of the state of incorporation to veilpiercing claims against out-of-state domestic firms perfunctorily
cite the doctrine.49

A.

The Internal Affairs Doctrine
The internal affairs doctrine is a unique conflict-of-laws
principle that is applied exclusively to questions of corporate
law."o In the past century, the doctrine has undergone some
1.

47 See, e.g., Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 646-47 (5th
Cir. 2002) (Louisiana law); Echostar Satellite Corp. v. Ultraview Satellite, Inc., No.
01-cv-00739-JLK, 2009 WL 1011204, at *7 (D. Colo. Apr. 15, 2009) (Colorado law);
Guinan v. A.I. duPont Hosp. for Children, 597 F. Supp. 2d 485, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
(Pennsylvania law), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. MG. v. A.I. duPont Hosp. for
Children, 393 F. App'x 884 (3d Cir. 2010); Sparton Elecs. Fla., Inc. v. Electropac Co.,
No. 8:05-cv-1495-T-30TBM, 2006 WL 2711842, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2006)
(Florida law); Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995) (New York
law); Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 723 N.E.2d 345, 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(Illinois law).
48 See, e.g., Gulley v. Moravec, No. 1:07-cv-788-DFH-TAB, 2008 WL 596002, at
*5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 29, 2008) ("The issue of shareholder liability for debts of the
corporation is one of the core topics covered by the internal affairs doctrine."); Janet
Cooper Alexander, Unlimited ShareholderLiability Through a ProceduralLens, 106
HARV. L. REV. 387, 411 (1992) ("The internal affairs doctrine responds to the need
for a uniform law governing the structural relationships of corporations that act in
numerous states. To permit each state to impose unlimited shareholder liability
through its tort law would make uniformity impossible . .").
49 See, e.g., Dassault Falcon Jet Corp. v. Oberflex, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 345, 349
(M.D.N.C. 1995) ("[Mlost, if not all, jurisdictions . . . use the 'internal affairs
doctrine' as their choice of law for piercing the corporate veil.").
5o Uniquely among the states, New York typically applies the law of the state of
incorporation to veil-piercing claims without invoking the internal affairs doctrine.
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New
York law); Flake v. Alper Holdings USA, Inc. (In re Alper Holdings USA, Inc.), 398
B.R. 736, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying New York law). New York courts have
suggested that they use this choice-of-law rule because it harmonizes governmental
interests; as the Second Circuit put it in connection with a contract dispute in 1993,
"[bjecause a corporation is a creature of state law whose primary purpose is to
insulate shareholders from legal liability, the state of incorporation has the greater
interest in determining when and if that insulation is to be stripped away." Kalb,
Voorhis & Co. v. Am. Fin. Corp., 8 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Soviet Pan
Am Travel Effort v. Travel Comm., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 126, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); see
also Mikropul Corp. v. Desimone & Chaplin-Airtech, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 940, 942
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Today, a hornbook would define the
important changes.'
doctrine as asserting that matters concerning a corporation's
"internal affairs" should be governed by the law of a single
jurisdiction, typically-but not necessarily-the jurisdiction that
chartered the entity. The internal affairs doctrine is thought by
some to have constitutional "underpinnings,"5 2 but its true basis
is economic: It promotes efficiency and enhances wealth creation.
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,5 3 the Supreme Court

made the bold assertion that the entire free market system
"depends at its core" upon a legal regime that governs
corporations
by the
law of a single jurisdiction,
"traditionally ... the State of its incorporation."5 4 The state's
interest, the Court explained, is in "promoting stable
relationships among parties involved in the corporations it
charters," an aim that makes sense when the interests at stake
are those belonging to parties involved in the corporation." A
corporation's "internal affairs" have been held to include a wide
range of activities and relationships, including the election and
appointment of officers and directors, the fiduciary duties owed
to shareholders,"' the adoption and amendment of by-laws,
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("New York has a paramount interest in preserving the integrity of
the corporate form under New York law by regulating the standards which control
piercing the veil of New York corporations."). This suggests that New York has not
fully rejected an interest-balancing approach for veil-piercing conflicts, but that it
views the chartering government's interest in protecting shareholders from liability
as almost absolute.
" See Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and
Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 75 (2009) ("[U]nder
modern law the [internal affairs doctrine] is best understood merely as a choice of
law regime. The roots of the [doctrine], however, lead back to a very different
historical reality and set of legal concerns.").
52 McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 209 (Del. 1987); see also Draper v.
Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d 859, 867 (Del. 1993) (identifying
constitutional "underpinnings" of the doctrine). In 1987, Delaware's Supreme Court
analyzed the constitutional basis for the doctrine and concluded that it was
compelled by the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. See McDermott, 531 A.2d. at 216-17 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982)). Some corporate law scholars find these arguments
unpersuasive, and the Supreme Court has never weighed in on the issue. See, e.g.,
ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 126 (2009) (asserting that
the doctrine does not have "special constitutional status").
53 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
" Id. at 90.

'6 Id. at 91.
56 See Harrison v. NetCentric Corp., 744 N.E.2d 622, 627-28 (Mass. 2001).
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shareholder voting, mergers and reorganizations, the issuance of
stock pursuant to stock option plans," and the declaration and
The Supreme Court has characterized
payment of dividends.
corporate internal affairs as those matters "peculiar to the
relationships among or between the corporation and its current
officers, directors, and shareholders.""
The doctrine was once widely construed not merely to mean
that a court should apply the law of the state of incorporation,
but that only the courts of the state of incorporation were
competent to interpret and apply a state's corporate law to its
corporations. In a 1933 case, Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York," the Supreme Court endorsed this version of the
doctrine, reversing the judgment of a circuit court of appeals that
decided a case on the merits by applying New Jersey corporate
law and reinstating the New York district court's decision to
decline jurisdiction. The Supreme Court explained:
It has long been settled doctrine that a court-state or
federal-sitting in one State will as a general rule decline to
interfere with or control by injunction or otherwise the
management of the internal affairs of a corporation organized
under the laws of another state but will leave controversies as
to such matters to the courts of the state of the domicile.
This abstention doctrine reflected the Court's adherence to
the "state action," "grant," or "concession" theory of the
corporation, which was predominant from the time the United
States Constitution was written until the mid-twentieth

5

See Mariasch v. Gillette Co., 521 F.3d 68, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2008).
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a (1971).
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).

" See RESTATEMENT
-'

288 U.S. 123 (1933).
61 Id. at 130.
60
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century.62 It also suggested widespread agreement that, in
deciding corporate law controversies, a court exercised what
amounted to lawmaking powers. 3
Over time, with the rise of American legal positivism, the
internal affairs doctrine was transformed. The notion that only a
state's own courts could "interfere with" or "control" a state's
corporations disappeared, and courts interpreted the doctrine to
mean that any court could apply the corporate law of the state of
incorporation to an out-of-state corporation.6 4
Yet, even before Guaranty Trust Co. of New York was

decided, the state action theory of the corporation had begun to
give way to an emerging law-and-economics ethos.6 ' By this
time, the enactment of general incorporation statutes had made
the role of the state in corporate formation less important, and
corporate managers had assumed the primary role in creating
corporate enterprise. 66 Corporate law theorists re-imagined the
firm as a set of private contractual relationships. This developed
6 The "concession theory" originated during a time when corporate charters
were special acts of legislation and characterizes the corporation as a privilege
granted by the legislature to the shareholders. For an overview of the theory, see
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 25-26 (1993). Under this view, the
corporate privilege includes: (1) perpetual life; (2) management by a board of
directors; (3) the "sanction of the state"; (4) limited powers and purposes; (5) limited
liability; and (6) a separate legal identity from its owners. I. MAURICE WORMSER,
DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATE PROBLEMS 11-15
(1981). Professor Wormser, who catalogued these elements in his 1927 treatise, held
a view of the corporation that was typical for corporate law professors of his time: He
believed that the corporation's juridical personhood was an "extraordinary privilege"
and must therefore be used only for legitimate business purposes. Id. at 8-9.
Implicit in the state action model is the notion that a corporation enjoys stategranted privileges in exchange for some benefit to the state, such as an economic
benefit. Id.
* See Thompson, supra note 6 ("Resolution of a piercing question is almost
always left to a judge's determination of corporate illegitimacy. Almost all state
corporations statutes simply ignore the whole idea of piercing the corporate veil.").
6 See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) ("So long
as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has created, each
corporation will be subject to the law of only one state.").
65 See, e.g., Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 119, 222 N.Y.S.
532, 543-44 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1927) ("a corporation is more nearly a method than
a thing" and is "a name for a useful and usual collection ofjural relations").
66 By 1875, more than ninety percent of states had general incorporation
statutes. See Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A
Continuation of Willard Hurst's Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 87
(1999).
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into the "nexus of contracts" theory, which views the firm as a
collection of contractual relationships between "factors of
production" who seek to reduce agency costs. 67 Today, the "nexus
of contracts" theory dominates the corporate law academy.6 8
In 1997, the Supreme Court recharacterized the internal
affairs doctrine.

In Atherton v. F.D.I.C.,6

the court was

confronted with an important post-Erie corporate law paradox:
Not all corporations are created by state law. Atherton involved
a federally chartered entity, and the case required the Supreme
Court to identify the source of law for duties of care for its
officers and directors.70 Had the firm been chartered by a state,
the duties of care would have been governed by state common
law;7 by analogy, then, federal common-law duties of care might
have applied to a firm chartered by the federal government. But
the Supreme Court balked at creating federal common law duties
of care for the officers and directors of federally-chartered
entities. It cautioned against "substitut[ing] analogy or formal
symmetry for the controlling legal requirement, namely, the
existence of a need to create federal common law arising out of a
significant conflict or threat to a federal interest." 2 The Court
then substituted analogy for the rule of decision: In the case of a
federally-chartered entity, the Court explained, the applicable
law was the law of the state "closest analogically to the State of
incorporation."7 The Court thus recharacterized the internal
affairs doctrine as a rule requiring the application of the law of a
single jurisdiction-but not necessarily the jurisdiction of
incorporation.

C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
61 See Michael
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
312-13 (1976).
* Nexus of contracts theorists tend to support the enforcement of global
corporate choice-of-law as efficient and wealth enhancing, and Larry E. Ribstein and
Erin A. O'Hara have taken the contractarian theory to its logical extreme by
advocating a "market" for law that includes the default liabilities of shareholders
and corporate parents to creditors. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 52, at 10.
69 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1997).
70 Id.
1 Id. at 218.
" Id. at 224.
73

Id.
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This version of the doctrine makes little sense, because the
internal affairs of a federally-chartered entity is governed by its
federal charter in all material respects; only corporate law
traditionally falling into common law spheres, such as the duties
of officers and directors, would be decided by state law. The
result was, counterintuitively, the opposite of the holding the
Court purported to make: The internal affairs of federallychartered entities are governed by federal law in some respects
and state law in others, and thus are not governed by the law of a
The Atherton rule has swiftly become
single jurisdiction.
incorporated into choice-of-law concerning the corporate form. In
2010, in a case of first impression, a federal district court in the
Eastern District of New York held that a federally-chartered
bank was governed by the veil-piercing laws of the state in which
it was headquartered, citing to Atherton."
As courts redefined the internal affairs doctrine and
strengthened their commitment to it, they left corporate law out
of the choice-of-law revolution that took place in the United
States in the second half of the twentieth century." Scholars
have written widely about a revolution in American conflicts law,
in which rigid choice-of-law rules gave way to a flexible approach
The
that balances policy and governmental interests."
reluctance of courts to apply a flexible, interest-balancing
approach to the most basic matters of cross-border corporate
status, authority, and liability has "exceptionalized" this area of
law domestically at a time when international commerce has
increasingly put the interests of chartering and nonchartering
governments in conflict. The application of the internal affairs
doctrine to questions about the juridical status of domestic firms
is, if nothing else, a noteworthy way in which the interests of
corporations and their participants have enjoyed special
protection from competing state interests.

" See Gunther v. Capital One, N.A., 703 F. Supp. 2d 264, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
" See Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for CorporateInternal
Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 162 (1985); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Choice

of Law and Capital Markets Regulation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1903, 1904 (2008); P. John
Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 17-18.
6 See,
e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 9-35 (2006).
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Other Bases for the Rule
Other grounds for utilizing the lex incorporationis are
sometimes asserted. A very few states have gone beyond the
common law internal affairs doctrine by codifying choice-of-law
in traditional, liability veil piercing for out-of-state firms. In
Massachusetts, for example, following a number of cases in
which the courts used a flexible choice-of-law rule," a state law
went into effect in 2004 requiring that "the liability of [an out-ofstate corporation's] stockholders and directors shall be governed
by the laws of the jurisdiction under which it is organized.""
Thus, Massachusetts's current law codifies the internal affairs
doctrine rule for veil piercing in questions of shareholder and
director liability.79 Texas has a similar statute."o The California
Corporations Code states that the liability of the director of an
out-of-state corporation to creditors is governed by the laws of the
"state or place" of incorporation.' And a New Jersey law codifies
the internal affairs rule for out-of-state limited liability
2.

77 See, e.g., John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Dykeman Elec. Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d
208, 230 (D. Mass 2003) ("The place of incorporation is only one of several factors
that Massachusetts courts consider in deciding what law to apply to piercing the
corporate veil involving a contractual dispute."); Evans v. Multicon Constr. Corp.,
574 N.E.2d 395, 400 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (applying Massachusetts veil-piercing
law to an Ohio corporation in a contract dispute); Cahaly v. Benistar Prop. Exch.
Trust Co., No. 01-0116BLS2, 2003 WL 25316218, at *7 n.11 (Mass. Super Sept. 23,
2003) (applying Massachusetts veil-piercing law to Delaware corporations in state
law claims including breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, conversion, and
breach of contract, based on the dispute's significant Massachusetts connection).
78 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 15.05(c) (West 2011).
7 See id. § 15.05. The law does not address choice-of-law for non-traditional veilpiercing inquiries, such as reverse veil-piercing, or for veil-piercing outside the
liability context, such as questions about the legal separation between the
shareholder or parent and the corporation in contract enforcement, evidence law, or
personal jurisdiction.
80 See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.104 (West 2011) ("The law of the
jurisdiction that governs an entity .. . applies to the liability of an owner, a member,
or a managerial official of the entity .. . for an obligation, including a debt or other
liability, of the entity .... .").
81 See CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2116 (West 1990) ("The directors of a foreign
corporation transacting intrastate business are liable to the corporation, its
shareholders, creditors, receiver, liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy for [various
wrongs] according to any applicable laws of the state or place of incorporation or
organization, whether committed or done in this state or elsewhere.").
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None of these statutes addresses veil piercing

outside the classic question of shareholder or parent company
liability for corporate debts.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws addresses
choice-of-law for veil piercing, but only in claims of shareholder
or parent company liability for corporate debts. Section 307
states: "The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied
to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's liability
to the corporation for assessments or contributions and to its
creditors for corporate debts."8 3
Few courts rely on this Restatement (Second) section and,
indeed, courts sometimes cite to other sections of the
Restatement (Second) in analyzing veil-piercing choice-of-law,
particularly the sections concerning choice-of-law in tort and
contract cases. 84 The Restatement does not address veil-piercing
choice-of-law outside the liability context.
B.

Some Exceptions to the "Well-Settled" Rule

Only rarely do courts decline to apply the veil-piercing law of
the chartering state to American firms. For example, in one
unusual case, a New York court refused to apply Arkansas veilpiercing law to two corporations that had been chartered by
Arkansas but had their corporate certificates revoked; since the
82 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-52 (West 2004) ("The laws of the state ... under
which a foreign limited liability company is organized govern. . . the liability of its
members and managers ..... ).
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 307 (1971). At least one
scholar has argued that a "comprehensive textual analysis" of the Restatement text,
comment, and reporter's note reveals that "it was not the intent of the drafters of
section 307 to mandate the application of the law of the state of incorporation to all
piercing claims," and some courts seem to agree. Crespi, supra note 46, at 111.
Professor Crespi argues that a "general choice-of-law approach that considers and
balances the interests of all jurisdictions that are involved" is superior to "summary
application of the law of the state of incorporation under the internal affairs
doctrine" because it is "more equitable to both corporate tort judgment and contract
creditors" and "removes the ability of corporations and their shareholders to limit
the shareholders' exposure to piercing claims merely by selectively incorporating or
reincorporating in jurisdictions such as Delaware or New York that have a relatively
restrictive piercing jurisprudence, and thereby externalizing the consequences of

their inequitable conduct. . . ." Id. at 125.
* See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 145 (1971) (noting that
"place of incorporation" is only one of several factors to be considered in the "most
significant relationship" test for a tort case); id. § 188 (1971) (same for a contract
case).
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entities were not "presently" incorporated in Arkansas, the court
held, Arkansas law did not govern. 5 In jurisdictional veil
piercing, courts may apply a specific state "alter ego" standard to
corporations chartered by other American states. In tort and
contract cases, some courts apply a version of the "significant
relationship" test.87 And in some contract cases, if a contractual
choice-of-law provision exists, the court might apply that choiceof-law provision to the veil-piercing claim. In the last five years,
the New Jersey courts have held that both the law of the
jurisdiction of incorporation and a flexible "governmental interest
analysis," are valid methods for determining choice of law in veilpiercing claims.
In most situations, and with most types of veil piercing,
courts apply the law of the state of incorporation to domestic
entities. They do so to adhere to the internal affairs doctrine,
which most courts and commentators assume includes matters
relating to a corporation's juridical status. In only a few limited
circumstances-some jurisdictional veil-piercing cases,89 a
8
Forum Ins. Co. v. Texarkoma Transp. Co., 229 A.D.2d 341, 342, 645 N.Y.S.2d
786, 787-88 (1st Dep't 1996).

86
87

See infra note 89.

Milliken & Co. v. Haima Group Corp., No. 08-22891-MC, 2010 WL 1286462,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2010); John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Dykeman Elec. Co.,
266 F. Supp. 2d 208, 230-31 (D. Mass. 2003).
8 See Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Ace Gaming, L.L.C., 713 F. Supp. 2d 427, 443
(D.N.J. 2010); D.R. Horton Inc.-N.J. v. Dynastar Dev., L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-00,
2005 WL 1939778, at *20-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. Aug. 10, 2005).
89 Jurisdictional veil-piercing cases always involve at least one out-of-state
party, often an out-of-state corporation, and they are an important exception to the
rule: Most states apply their own "alter ego" standards to out-of-state firms,
domestic or foreign, in connection with their long-arm statutes. But see, e.g., InterMed, Inc. v. ASI Med., Inc., No. 09-CV-383, 2010 WL 3063014, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Aug.
2, 2010) (applying the law of the state of incorporation for veil-piercings). Moreover,
a state's jurisdictional "alter ego" standard often varies from the standards it uses
for other types of veil piercing. See, e.g., Dorfman v. Marriott Int'l Hotels, Inc., No.
99 CIV 10496(CSH), 2002 WL 14363, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2002) (using different
veil-piercing standards for liability veil-piercing claim and personal jurisdiction veilpiercing claim). In 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit questioned
whether choice-of-law for jurisdictional veil piercing is fundamentally different from
choice-of-law for liability veil piercing and concluded that "this complicated choice of
law question is an open issue." Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579,
587 (5th Cir. 2010).
It should be clear, however, that jurisdictional veil piercing is different from
liability veil piercing, and thus the choice-of-law issues are different. Liability veil
piercing is an equitable power that courts assert where limited liability might
otherwise leave an injured party without a remedy. Limited liability is not a
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minority of contract disputes involving choice-of-law provisions,90
and a handful of torts cases"-will courts employ a different

necessary feature of the corporation; even today, state laws provide for shareholder
liability in many circumstances. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Limited Liability Company Acts-Issues Relating to Formation of
Limited Liability Company and Addition or Disassociationof Members Thereto, 43
A.L.R.6th 611 (2009). Where a government has provided limited liability for a
business entity, the courts of that government generally assert the power to
recognize or reject that limited liability in the interest of justice. See, e.g.,
Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P'ship, 542 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the
general principle for piercing the corporate veil is to impose liability when doing so
would achieve an equitable result); HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, L.C., 495
F.3d 927, 935-36 (8th Cir. 2007). And by applying lex incorporationis,these courts
encourage other jurisdictions to protect shareholders of in-state entities to the same
extent that in-state courts would.
" A number of courts become sidetracked by the question of how contractual
choice-of-law provisions affect the veil-piercing analysis, particularly when both
parties agree that it should apply. Most courts hold that veil piercing is collateral to
a contract and thus, because it was not part of the parties' negotiations and
expectations, a choice-of-law provision does not bind the parties on a veil-piercing
issue that arises in a contract dispute. See, e.g., Davaco, Inc. v. AZ3, Inc., No. 3:07cv-803, 2008 WL 2243382, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2008) (applying the veil-piercing
law of the "state of incorporation," Quebec, although the contract at issue had a
choice-of-law provision selecting Texas law, because "a choice of law provision in a
contract does not alter the rule that the law of the state of incorporation governs the
alter ego analysis"); Schlumberger Logelco Inc. v. Morgan Equip. Co., No. C-94-1776
MHP, 1996 WL 251951, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996) ("the alter ego theory of
liability does not 'arise from' or 'relate to' the contracts"); Dassault Falcon Jet Corp.
v. Oberflex, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 345, 348 (M.D.N.C. 1995) ("the issue of piercing the
corporate veil is collateral to and not part of the parties' negotiations or expectations
with respect to the contract"); United Trade Assocs. Ltd. v. Dickens & Matson (USA)
Ltd., 848 F. Supp. 751, 759 (E.D. Mich. 1994) ("the issue of piercing the corporate
veil is collateral to the contract, and thus this Court is not bound by the choice of law
provision"). But see Duffy v. Vision Hardware Group, Inc., No. 01-1281, 2001 WL
1301407, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 2001) (applying New York veil piercing law because
both parties agreed that it applied pursuant to a choice-of-law provision in a
contract). A minority of courts have simply applied the veil-piercing law of the
jurisdiction selected in the choice-of-law provision. See, e.g., IGEN Intl, Inc. v. Roche
Diagnostics GMBH, 335 F.3d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that Delaware
veil-piercing law should be applied to a Swiss company because a contract giving rise
to the claim was governed by Delaware law but holding that it need not decide the
veil-piercing question because the parent corporation did not appeal it). Clearly that
approach is wrong since the choice-of-law provision should have prompted the court
to apply that state's choice-of-law rule, which in most cases would have resulted in
the application of the law of the state of incorporation. See Sofi Classic S.A. de C.V.
v. Hurowitz, 444 F. Supp. 2d 231, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (interpreting contractual
choice-of-law provision selecting New York law to require the application of New
York choice-of-law rules, leading the court to apply the law of the states of
incorporation-Massachusetts and South Carolina-to veil-piercing claims).
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choice-of-law rule. 92 There is thus no mystery that veil-piercing
choice-of-law has created little controversy and attracted little
attention from scholars of either corporate law or conflicts of law.
III. CHOICE OF ENTITY LAW FOR FOREIGN ENTITIES
The preceding Part described choice-of-law for questions
about the juridical status of domestic corporations. It showed
that the predominant choice-of-law rule is the application of the
lex incorporationis, and that many courts and commentators
consider veil piercing to fall within the scope of the internal
affairs doctrine, a choice-of-law principle that applies uniquely to
a corporation's internal affairs. This Part shows that when the
juridical status of a foreign corporation is in question, state and

1 Infrequently, a court will apply the veil-piercing law of the jurisdiction where
a tort injury occurred if the application of the chartering government's law would
foreclose liability. In Yoder v. Honeywell, 104 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 1997), for
example, a Colorado resident brought a tort claim in federal district court in New
York against a Delaware corporation for injuries sustained from a computer
keyboard in Colorado. The case was transferred to a federal court in Colorado, and
thus, on appeal, the Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the law of the state in which the transferor court sat-New
York-provided the relevant choice-of-law rule in a veil-piercing claim against the
parent company of the keyboard's manufacturer. Id. at 1219.
New York law required the court to apply the law of the state of incorporation.
Id. at 1219-20. The Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals nonetheless
decided that it would apply the veil-piercing law of the forum state, Colorado:
If we were to apply [the New York rule] the law of Delaware, the state of
[the defendant's] incorporation, would apply to the corporate veil issue.
Because the substantive tort law of Colorado applies here, however, we
question whether New York would apply Delaware law to this related
issue. In any event, our review of Delaware law indicates it is similar to
Colorado, although Delaware may require somewhat more to pierce a
corporate veil. Thus, we analyze the corporate veil issue under Colorado
law.
Id. at 1220 (citations omitted).
The Court's explanation suggests that it was wary of applying Delaware law
because the Delaware standard was more difficult to satisfy than the Colorado
standard. Yoder and similar cases indicate that courts are reluctant to apply the
veil-piercing laws of other jurisdictions if this will insulate out-of-state entities from
liability for harming in-state residents. This rationale makes sense, of course,
because in-state residents have not agreed to the limited liability schemes of other
states, and a state has an interest in ensuring that its residents will not be left
bearing the costs of out-of-state liability schemes. Nonetheless, even in tort cases,
only a small minority of courts depart from the general rule.
92 See supra notes 89-91.
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federal courts routinely abandon this approach and reject the law
of the chartering jurisdiction. Instead, they generally apply the
veil-piercing law of an American state to the foreign firm.
This Part first describes what types of business entities are
chartered outside the United States, and thus fall within the
scope of the term "foreign corporation." It highlights treatychartered corporations, which are created by international
agreements between sovereign nations, and which exist above or
outside the legal frameworks of their nation creators. The legal
status and activities of treaty-chartered entities pose unique
choice-of-entity-law challenges and have received little scrutiny
from the corporate law academy.
Next, this Part examines how American courts approach
veil-piercing choice-of-law for foreign corporations. It contends
that in such cases, most American courts balance governmental
interests and conclude by applying the law of an American state.
This Part catalogs a significant body of case law in which
American courts apply American veil-piercing laws to foreignchartered firms, notes a small number of exceptions, and
underscores its findings with several important empirical studies
of veil piercing in the United States. In doing so, this Part
demonstrates that a double standard exists in choice-of-law
for domestic and foreign firms, and that the consistency
and predictability that domestic corporations enjoy in choiceof-law questions concerning veil piercing are not enjoyed by
corporations chartered abroad.
A.

Foreign Commercial Entities

Virtually all foreign nations charter business organizations
and treat them as legal persons for at least some purposes. This
is true of democracies in first-world economies, single-party
socialist states, authoritarian regimes, and even military
dictatorships." Many entities created by these governments
" The United States, of course, is an example of a first-world democracy that
charters numerous corporations each year. China is a single-party socialist state
that incorporates business entities under its 2006 Company Act. See Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (
[Company Law of the People's
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the lth Nat'l People's
Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) 2006 China Law LEXIS 7956,
available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/lawen_info.jsp?docid=50878.
Saudi Arabia is an example of an authoritarian regime that charters business
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operate in streams of commerce that intersect with American
interests. It is not uncommon to find entities that incorporate
abroad but operate principally or exclusively in the United
States, are wholly owned or controlled by American interests,
and even function hand-in-glove with the United States military
in theaters of war.94 Most nations offer limited liability to some,
if not all, of their juridical entities.95
There is a strong political facet to the legal recognition of
corporations operating transnationally, and this is reflected in
the work of the judicial branch. In theory, a corporation
chartered under the laws of an unrecognized government does
not have standing in federal court in a diversity case, on the
basis that such an entity is not a "citizen[] or subject[] of a
foreign state" for jurisdictional purposes." In 2002, the Supreme
Court identified this issue as a problem but did not resolve it."
American courts tend to assert jurisdiction over entities
regardless of the political sovereignty of the governments that
create them. For example, the United States does not recognize
the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a sovereign nation, but courts
regularly treat Taiwanese corporations as proper subjects for

under its companies law. See BOARD OF CAPITAL MARKET
AUTHORITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI
entities

ARABIA (2006), available at http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/CORPORATE%20
GOVERNANCE%20REGULATIONS-2011.pdf. Fiji is an example of a military
dictatorship that charters business entities under its Companies Act. See Companies
Act of the Republic of Fiji, available at http://www.paclii.org/fj/legis/consol-act_
OK/cal07/.
9 For an example of the last of these, see McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 695 F.
Supp. 2d 883, 890-91 (S.D. Ind. 2010 (discussing subsidiaries of Kellogg, Brown &
Root Services, Inc. that were organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands and
headquartered in Dubai and were alleged to have tortiously injured forty-seven
members of the Indiana National Guard at a water-treatment facility in southern
Iraq during the war).
9 For a concise history of the spread of limited liability across the Western
World, see Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP.
L. 573, 577-605 (1986).
96 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
1
See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536
U.S. 88, 92 (2002) (noting that it "need not decide" whether "a foreign state must be
diplomatically recognized by our own Government to qualify as such under"
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), which provides district courts with diversity jurisdiction over
citizens or subjects of a foreign state).
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personal jurisdiction under Article III." However, courts have
occasionally refused to grant standing to some corporations that
are chartered by foreign nations without diplomatic recognition
by the State Department." Foreign governments are savvy to
Several foreign
the political dimension of corporate law.
governments that are not recognized by the State Department
have incorporated corporations in the United States, through
which they have conducted government business and brought
lawsuits in American courts that they could not have done as
sovereigns or, presumably, as corporations organized under their
own laws. 00
Throughout modern history, courts have taken the lead role
in integrating foreign business entities into our legal system. For
example, Article III grants federal courts original jurisdiction
over cases involving citizens or subjects of foreign states. 01
Congress has provided alienage diversity jurisdiction to disputes
between citizens of American states and "citizens or subjects of a
foreign state" and has specified that "a corporation shall be
deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of

" See, e.g., Everflow Tech. Corp. v. Millenium Elecs., Inc., No. C 07-05795 JF
(HRL), 2008 WL 4793410 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2008) (stating that Plaintiff Everflow
Technology Corp. is incorporated under the laws of the Republic of China (Taiwan)).
" See, e.g., Fed. Republic of Ger. v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747, 757 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (holding that the Weimar Art Collection was an instrumentality of the
German Democratic Republic, a government that the United States did not
recognize, and thus did not have standing to sue in American courts). In an 1814
case, Justice Story suggested that a corporation established under the laws of a
foreign government could become hostile in character if the country that
incorporated it became hostile. See Soc'y for the Propagation of the Gospel v.
Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 764 (C.C.N.H. 1814) ("[W]here a corporation is established
in a foreign country, by a foreign government, it is undoubtedly an alien corporation,
be its members who they may; and if the country become hostile, it may, for some
purposes at least, be clothed with the same character.").
100See, e.g., Republic of Transkei v. I.N.S., 923 F.2d 175, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(detailing how the Republic of Transkei created a "small non-profit corporation"
known as its "Washington Bureau" to "disseminate[] trade, tourism, and political
information and [to encourage] investment in and trade with Transkei"); Achievers
Invs., Inc. v. Karalekas, 675 A.2d 946, 947 (D.C. Ct. App. 1996) (detailing how the
Republic of Bophuthatswana incorporated Achievers Investments, Inc. in the
District of Columbia, installed government officials as directors and officers, and
assigned a contract claim to the corporation so that it could prosecute the claim in a
U.S. court).
101U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
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business." 02 The word "State" in this provision referred to states
of the United States of America; both the statute and its
legislative history are silent on the subject of foreign
corporations.' 03 In the face of this silence, the federal courts have
construed the Act as applying to foreign corporations but have
split, for example, on whether a foreign corporation with its
principal place of business within the United States is, for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a dual citizen of both the
nation in which it was incorporated and the state of its principal
Such threshold issues about foreign
place of business.o4
corporate identity, citizenship, and standing under the Judiciary
Act historically have been resolved by judge-made rules.'
B.

Treaty-CharteredEntities

One relatively new form of foreign corporation is the treatyThese are entities created by joint
chartered corporation.
ventures of multiple nations, in which a treaty constitutes the
entity's articles of incorporation.0 6 For example, United Arab
Shipping Company, an international shipping corporation, was
created by a treaty among Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Iraq in 1976, and has
incorporated a subsidiary, United Arab Agencies, Inc., in the
United States.'0 7 The Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3), (c)(1) (2006).
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3628 (3d ed. 2011).
10' Compare Trans World Hosp. Supplies Ltd. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 542 F.
Supp. 869, 871 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (treating a Cayman Islands corporation with its
principal place of business in Tennessee as a citizen of Tennessee so as not to defeat
diversity jurisdiction), with Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas,
S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1994) (treating a Bermudan corporation with its
principal place of business in Oregon as a citizen of both Bermuda and Oregon so as
to defeat diversity jurisdiction).
10' See James W. Moore & Donald T. Weekstein, Corporationsand Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction:A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1426,
1445 (1964) (discussing the "judicially created fiction" of corporate citizenship).
10e See generally Note, CorporationsFormed Pursuant to Treaty, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 1431 (1963) (describing corporations formed using treaties in place of articles of
incorporation).
107 See United Arab Shipping Co. v. Eagle Sys., Inc., No. CV408-067, 2008 WL
4087121, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 2, 2008); Mangattu v. MV IBN Hayyan, 35 F.3d 205,
208 (5th Cir. 1994); Company Profile, UASC, http://www.uasc.net/company-profile
(last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (stating that UASC operates out of Cranford, New Jersey,
among other locations).
102
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and Oman created Gulf Air, Inc., an airline and "joint stock
company with limited liability," by treaty; the airline has claimed
to be governed by the laws of all four treaty partners."os Both of
these entities have appeared as litigants in United States
courts.109
Treaty-chartered corporations may have both government
and private investors, but they are not "creatures" of any
particular nation's laws and are essentially stateless. They raise
issues of sovereignty and international law that have received
little attention from legal scholars. For example, upon what
theory do the federal courts have jurisdiction over disputes
involving stateless commercial entities? Federal courts have had
trouble integrating such entities into the legislative scheme of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.1 10 The existence of
international corporations that are, in many respects, above the
laws of their nation creators suggests that when such entities
share streams of commerce with American interests, American
governmental institutions may have a particularly assertive role
to play in supervising the interface between the stateless
corporation, its participants, and American law.
C.

The Double Standard

In veil-piercing analysis of any sort, American courts
infrequently apply the law of the foreign chartering government
to foreign entities. Instead, courts generally apply the entity law
of some American state to such firms after engaging in a choiceof-law analysis that balances governmental interests."1 This
See LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1400, 1402, 1406 (E.D. Va. 1988).
See id.; United Arab Shipping Co., 2008 WL 4087121, at *1.
no Commercial entities created by charter or intergovernmental agreement do
not fit squarely within the sovereign immunity framework created by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, and federal courts have not taken a uniform
approach to the so-called "pooled" interests of multiple foreign governments. Thus,
for example, federal courts have held that the United Arab Shipping Co. was an
instrumentality of a foreign state-or, rather, six foreign states-under the FSIA,
but that Industries Chemiques du Senegale, a chemical company organized under
the laws of Senegal by intergovernmental agreement among Senegal, India, Ivory
Coast, Nigeria, and Cameroon, and sixty-five percent owned by those nations, was
not an instrumentality of a foreign state under the FSIA. See id. at *2; see also Sea
Transp. Contractors, Ltd. v. Indus. Chemiques du Senegal, 411 F. Supp. 2d 386, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
1os
109

n..See infra notes 112-18.
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section begins by establishing this trend and then notes a small
number of exceptions, the majority of which have been decided by
the federal courts in the Southern District of New York.
Any review of choice-of-law decisions in veil-piercing cases
reveals that foreign firms are generally held to domestic legal
standards. This is true for simple cases of shareholder or parent
company liability for corporate debts in contract and tort cases,
as well as for less common types of veil-piercing cases. For
example:
* In 2010, a district court in Florida applied Florida
veil-piercing law to a Chinese corporation in a
garnishment proceeding after concluding that Florida
had the "most significant relationship" with the
issue.11 2
* In 2008, the Delaware Chancery Court applied
Delaware alter-ego law to a Dutch limited liability
company in analyzing a jurisdictional veil-piercing
claim. 113 The court noted that Dutch law should have
been applied to the Dutch entity, but proceeded to
apply Delaware law because neither of the parties had
briefed Dutch law.114
* In 2008, in a tort case, a district court in the Western
District of New York applied Nebraska veil-piercing
law to corporations chartered in Massachusetts, Hong
Kong, and France."' The court gave no explanation
for its choice of law and merely noted that Nebraska
law governed all aspects of the case.116

* In 2005, a district court in Delaware applied
Delaware veil-piercing law to the wholly owned
Spanish subsidiary of a Delaware corporation on an
"agency" veil-piercing theory in a case alleging fraud
claims under Delaware law.1 17
12 See Milliken & Co. v. Haima Group Corp., No. 08-22891-MC, 2010 WL
1286462, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2010).
113 See EBG Holdings L.L.C. v. Vredezicht's Gravenhage 109 B.V., No. 3184VCP, 2008 WL 4057745, at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 2008) (applying Delaware veilpiercing test to a Dutch limited liability company).
114 Id.
115See Playwell Toy, Inc. v. Bureau Veritas Consumer Prods. Servs., Inc., No.
03-CV-0704C(SC), 2008 WL 4372654, at *2 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008).

116 Id.

See Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Bentley Pharm., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 426, 432 (D.
Del. 2005).
117
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* In 2004, the Ninth Circuit for the United States Court
of Appeals applied California "alter-ego" law to hold
that due process was violated when the sole
shareholder of a Canadian corporation was added as a
judgment debtor to a default judgment against the
corporation.118

Numerous similar cases, most of which were decided after 1990,
By
apply domestic veil-piercing laws to foreign firms.11 9
11 Katzir's Floor & Home Design, Inc. v. M-MLS.com, 394 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th
Cir. 2004).
n1 See, e.g., Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Talon Petroleum, C.A., 907 F.2d 1012,
1017-19 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying Oklahoma veil-piercing test to corporations
chartered in Venezuela and the Cayman Islands); Culbreth v. Amosa (Pty) Ltd., 898
F.2d 13, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania veil-piercing law to claims
against a United Kingdom corporation that owned a majority of shares in a United
Kingdom corporation that wholly owned an Illinois subsidiary); Craig v. Lake
Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying New Jersey veilpiercing law to a corporation organized under United Kingdom law in a case
removed to federal district court in Pennsylvania, alleging personal injury claims
under New Jersey law); Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 542 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir.
1976) (applying the veil-piercing law of Kentucky to a German GmbH in a tort case);
TSS Sportswear, Ltd. v. Swank Shop (Guam) Inc., 380 F.2d 512, 523 (9th Cir. 1967)
(applying Guam veil-piercing law to corporation chartered in Hong Kong); Miramax
Film Corp. v. Abraham, No. 01 CV 5202(GBD), 2003 WL 22832384, at*6-7 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 25, 2003) (applying New York jurisdictional alter ego test to corporations
chartered in Denmark and the Island of Guensey); Accordia Ne., Inc. v. Thesseus
Int'l Asset Fund, 205 F. Supp. 2d 176, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying New York
veil-piercing test to a corporation chartered by the Netherlands Antilles); Dorfman v.
Marriott Int'l Hotels, Inc., No. 99 CIV 10496(CSH), 2002 WL 14363, at *18-19
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2002) (applying generalized American veil-piercing test to a
corporation chartered in Hungary in a tort case); RNB Garments Phil., Inc. v. Lau,
No. 98 CIV 4561(DLC), 1999 WL 223153, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999) (applying
New York veil-piercing law to a corporation chartered in Hong Kong); Curiale v.
Tiber Holding Corp., No. CIV. A. 95-5284, 1997 WL 713950, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10,
1997) (applying New York veil-piercing test to a corporation chartered in Bermuda);
M & R Marking Sys., Inc. v. Top Stamp, Inc., No. CIV. 96-828(WGB), 1996 WL
805485, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 1996) (applying generalized American veil-piercing
test to four corporations chartered in Hong Kong); Costamar Shipping Co. v. KimSail, Ltd., No. 95 CIV. 3349 (KTD), 1995 WL 736907, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12,
1995) (applying generalized American veil-piercing test to corporations chartered in
Greece and the Cayman Islands); Lowndes v. Falcon, No. 90-4829, 1992 WL 73198,
at *5-7 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 1992) (applying Texas veil-piercing test to a corporation
chartered in Belgium); Foster v. Berwind Corp., No. 90-0857, 1991 WL 21666, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law to a corporation chartered in
Bermuda); Mothersill D.I.S.C., Corp. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, S.A., 112 F.R.D. 87,
89-90 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (applying generalized American veil-piercing test to a
corporation chartered in the Netherlands Antilles), rev'd on other grounds, 831 F.2d
59 (5th Cir. 1987); Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 727, 732-35
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying indeterminate American veil-piercing test to a corporation
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comparison, far fewer cases applied the foreign chartering
jurisdiction's veil-piercing laws, all of them having been decided
since the mid-1990s. 2 0
The existence of a double standard is corroborated by the
empirical work of several scholars of veil piercing. Robert B.
Thompson published an empirical study in 1991 that analyzed
corporate law veil-piercing cases for all years prior to 1986 and
documented which jurisdiction's law was being applied; he
identified no cases that applied the law of a jurisdiction outside
the United States.12 ' In 2009, John H. Matheson published a
study of 360 veil-piercing cases involving parent-subsidiary
corporate relationships from 1990 to 2008 and again identified no
cases that applied the law of a jurisdiction outside the United
States.12 2 Most recently, Christina Boyd and David Hoffman
chartered in the United Kingdom); Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 239 A.2d
629, 632 (Del. 1968) (affirming the application by the Delaware Chancery Court of
Delaware veil-piercing law to a Mexican corporation); Eckel Indus., Inc. v. Verson
Europa S.A., No. 966340, 1999 WL 818604, at *3-4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 1999)
(applying Massachusetts veil-piercing law in an analysis of whether to disregard the
corporate form of two affiliated subsidiaries, one incorporated in Belgium and the
other in the United Kingdom); Serio v. Ardra Ins. Co., 304 A.D.2d 362, 362, 761
N.Y.S.2d 1, 1 (1st Dep't 2003) (applying New York veil-piercing law to a closely-held
reinsurance company chartered in Bermuda); Stockacre Ltd. v. PepsiCo Inc., 265
A.D.2d 398, 399, 696 N.Y.S.2d 500 (2d Dep't 1999) (applying New York veil-piercing
law to a corporation chartered in Denmark).
120 See, e.g., Davaco, Inc. v. AZ3, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-803, 2008 WL 2243382, at *1
(N.D. Tex. May 30, 2008) (applying the veil-piercing law of the "state of
incorporation," Quebec, to a corporation chartered there); Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(applying the veil-piercing laws of the jurisdictions of incorporation to corporations
chartered in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Mauritius); Sunnyside Dev.
Co. v. Opsys, Ltd., No. C 05-0553 MHP, 2005 WL 1876106, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8,
2005) (applying British veil-piercing law to a British corporation); Kingdom 5-KR-41,
Ltd. v. Star Cruises PLC, No. 01 Civ. 2946(AGS), 2003 WL 262507, at *4 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2003); Mega Tech Int'l Corp. v. Al-Saghyir Establishment, No. 96
CIV 8711 LBS, 1999 WL 269896, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1999) (applying Saudi
Arabian veil-piercing law to two Saudi Arabian companies on a jurisdictional veilpiercing theory); Schlumberger Logelco Inc. v. Morgan Equip. Co., No. C-94-1776
MHP, 1996 WL 251951, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996) (applying Austrian law to an
Austrian corporation); cf Kempe v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 683 F. Supp.
1064, 1072 (E.D. La. 1988) (asserting in dicta that a Louisiana court would apply
Bermuda veil-piercing law to a Bermuda corporation).
121 See Thompson, supra note 6, at 1051 tbl 6. Unfortunately,
Professor
Thompson did not reveal the extent to which courts were applying domestic state
laws to entities chartered abroad.
122 See John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical
Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L.
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surveyed veil-piercing complaints and counterclaims filed in
district courts from 2000 to 2005 and categorized targeted
corporations by jurisdiction of incorporation. 12 3 They found that
foreign corporations accounted for roughly five percent of all
corporations targeted for veil piercing; only the states of Illinois,
Florida, Delaware, and New York chartered more corporations
that were targeted for veil piercing in American courts than did
foreign governments.124 Taken together, these empirical studies
suggest that a meaningful number of foreign corporations are
being sued on veil-piercing claims, and that courts are applying
domestic veil-piercing laws to them.
Most of the handful of cases in which American courts have
applied the foreign chartering jurisdiction's entity laws to a
foreign entity are found in the federal courts in the Southern
District of New York.125 By no means, however, is this the
clear cut choice-of-law rule in New York; the trend, even in the
state's federal courts, is to apply domestic law to foreign firms.126
REV. 1091, 1119 tbl. 5 (2009). Matheson probably did not find cases applying foreign
entity laws because he focused on corporate groups with American subsidiaries.
When piercing the corporate veil to reach the parent of an American subsidiary, the
choice of law turns on the jurisdiction of incorporation of the American entity.
1'
Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104
N.w. U. L. REV. 853, 856, 882 (2010).
124 Id. at 885 fig. 6. Unfortunately, Professors Boyd and Hoffman do not disclose
which jurisdictions' veil-piercing laws were applied to these foreign-chartered
entities.
"' See, e.g., Davaco, Inc., 2008 WL 2243382, at * 1 (applying the veil-piercing law
of the "state of incorporation," Quebec, to a corporation chartered there);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 683, 686-87, 689 (applying the
veil-piercing laws of the jurisdictions of incorporation to corporations chartered in
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Mauritius); Sunnyside Dev. Co., 2005
WL 1876106, at *3 (applying British veil-piercing law to a British corporation);
Kingdom 5-KR-41, Ltd., 2003 WL 262507, at *4 n.2; Mega Tech Int'l Corp., 1999 WL
269896, at *8 (applying Saudi Arabian veil-piercing law to two Saudi Arabian
companies on a jurisdictional veil-piercing theory).
126 See, e.g., Miramax Film Corp. v. Abraham, No. 01 CV 5202(GBD), 2003 WL
22832384, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003) (applying New York jurisdictional alter ego
test to corporations chartered in Denmark and the Island of Guensey because the
parties' briefs "rely exclusively on New York law"); Accordia Ne., Inc. v. Thesseus
Int'l Asset Fund, 205 F. Supp. 2d 176, 181-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying New York
veil-piercing test to a corporation chartered by the Netherlands Antilles); RNB
Garments Phil., Inc. v. Lau, No. 98 CIV 4561(DLC), 1999 WL 223153, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999) (applying New York veil-piercing law to a corporation
chartered in Hong Kong); Costamar Shipping Co. v. Kim-Sail, Ltd., No. 95 CIV. 3349
(KTD), 1995 WL 736907, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1995) (applying indeterminate
American veil-piercing test to corporations chartered in Greece and the Cayman
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Outside New York, very few courts have applied foreign law to
foreign firms.127 For example, although a 2006 Massachusetts
law requires the application of the law of the foreign chartering
government to veil-piercing questions involving shareholder
liability, the law has never been cited in a case involving a
foreign firm. 2 8
D. Why Do American Courts Employ a Double Standard?
Why might American courts reject the veil-piercing choice-oflaw rule that they apply to domestic corporations when a foreign
corporation is involved? A main reason is that the principles
underlying the domestic rule are unsound. Questions about the
juridical status of business entities do not fit squarely within the
internal affairs doctrine. It may be easy to overlook this fine
point within our domestic system of horizontal federalismparticularly since many American courts and commentators
wrongly assume that veil-piercing laws are the same from state
to state-but it is difficult to ignore when a court is asked to
apply the entity law of a foreign government that is meaningfully
different from its American counterpart.
Other factors may also be responsible for the choice-of-law
double standard, including the practical difficulty of ascertaining
the veil-piercing law of a foreign jurisdiction, and the fact that
some foreign jurisdictions lack equitable veil-piercing laws that
are similar to those found in the United States. Both factors
make it easier to apply American laws to foreign entities. It is
also common for both parties to agree that a domestic law should
apply, which can circumvent the conflict of laws analysis.
Finally, some veil-piercing inquiries involve tiers of corporate
ownership that span as many as four or five sovereign
Islands); Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 727, 732-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(applying indeterminate American veil-piercing test to a corporation chartered in
the United Kingdom); Serio v. Ardra Ins. Co., 304 A.D.2d 362, 362, 761 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1
(1st Dep't 2003) (applying New York veil-piercing law to a closely-held reinsurance
company chartered in Bermuda).
127 See Davaco, Inc., 2008 WL 2243382, at *1 (applying the veil-piercing law of
the "state of incorporation," Quebec, to a corporation chartered there); Sunnyside
Dev. Co., 2005 WL 1876106, at *3 (applying British veil-piercing law to a British
corporation); Schlumberger Logelco Inc. v. Morgan Equip. Co., No. C-94-1776 MHP,
1996 WL 251951, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996) (applying Austrian law to an
Austrian corporation).
128 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 15.05(c) (West
2004).
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jurisdictions and would require the application of the veilpiercing laws of many different governments. 129
Such
"compound" analysis may be avoided by rejecting the lex
incorporationis rule.
Cases involving tiers of corporate
ownership that span multiple jurisdictions are typically resolved
by the application of the law of a single American jurisdiction.
The Unsound Principles Underlying the Domestic Rule
The "well-settled"1 30 rule that the law of the jurisdiction of
incorporation governs veil piercing is based on the presumption
that veil piercing falls within the internal affairs doctrine, 3 ' that
the government with the greatest interest in defining the
juridical status of an entity is the government that created it,"2
or that economic and contractarian values require shareholders'
expectations about a firm's juridical status to be enforced. All of
these ideas are logically unsound, a fact that becomes clear when
they are proffered to justify the application of the entity law of a
foreign chartering government. The widely-held presumption
that issues of corporate form fall within the internal affairs
doctrine is mistaken: Veil piercing, in all its forms, is outside the
scope of the internal affairs doctrine. The disregard of the
corporate form by a court exercising its equitable powers does not
exclusively implicate a corporation's internal relationships, nor
does it frustrate the legitimate expectations of the shareholders,
even when it relates specifically to issues of shareholder liability.
Judicial decisions to pierce the corporate veil always
implicate the interests of third parties. As we have seen, the
reach of the internal affairs doctrine has been limited to
corporate governance and to transactions that occur between or
among corporate insiders, and it has excluded actions such as
tender offers that involve third parties.
Issues about a
corporation's juridical status concern the relationship between
the corporation, its insiders, and those outside the corporation.
1.

See infra Part III.D.4.
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 48, at 410.
1I
See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 122, at 1096; O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note
52, at 115 ("The IAD only covers creditor protection rules that affect shareholders'
financial rights, including shareholders' personal liability for corporate harms . . . .").
132 See Schlumberger Logelco Inc., 1996 WL 251951, at *3 (applying Austrian
law to an Austrian corporation because "Austria has a substantial interest in
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil of one of its corporations.").
129

130

962

ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 85:925

Courts only disregard the corporate form when the interest of
some third party is at stake. In jurisdictional veil piercing, for
example, the issue is not merely the relationship of the
shareholders to the corporation, but the relationship of both to
the state and to the scope of the court's personal jurisdiction.13
Jurisdictional veil piercing is not a private law issue, and the
shareholders could not agree to exempt each other, or anyone
else, from a court's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction.'3 4
Likewise, in questions of shareholder liability, veil-piercing
analysis deals with the relationship between the shareholders,
the corporation, and some third party, typically a tort victim or a
contractual party. The importance of the third party to the veilpiercing analysis is exemplified by the element of fraud required
by most American veil-piercing standards, which must be
satisfied by proof that a third party has been defrauded. 3 5 The
fraud requirement highlights the centrality of third-party
interests to the veil-piercing inquiry.
Veil piercing's equitable nature is essential in understanding
why it falls outside the internal affairs doctrine, and thus why
courts typically balk at extending the doctrine to require the
application of the veil-piercing law of foreign governments. A
court's decision to disregard the corporate form is a singular
exercise of equitable discretion that applies only to a specific
facet of the legal case before it. It does not actually affect the
corporation's operations, activities, or affairs in any way. By
disregarding the corporate form in a case, the court does not
dissolve the corporation, or even make it likely that a second
court will pierce the same corporation's veil in a different case. It
does not affect the relationship among the interested parties in
any context outside the narrow dispute before the court, and the
corporation need not change its operations to comply with the
court's decision or to continue to operate. This, of course, is
significantly different from judicial decisions that do implicate a
133 Cf Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of PersonalJurisdiction,
115 HARv. L. REV. 1559, 1574-75 (2002) (analyzing sovereign immunity as a
doctrine of personal jurisdiction because it reflects a lack of power by the courts to
command the appearance of a foreign sovereign).
134 Cf Red Bull Assocs. v. Best W. Int'l Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988) (on
a motion to transfer venue, private parties' contractual choice of forum did not have
"dispositive effect" on where the case was tried).
135 See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
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corporation's internal affairs, such as the election of directors,
the adoption of by-laws, shareholder voting, or the declaration of
dividends, which generally impose real and often permanent
changes on an entity's operation or the composition or activities
of its stakeholders. Moreover, a court's decision to pierce the
corporate veil to establish shareholder or parent company
liability does not make all shareholders or all parent companies
liable for all corporate debts; it merely makes a specific
shareholder or parent company liable for a specific debt.
Shareholder expectations about a corporation's juridical
Corporate
status are not entitled to special deference.
shareholders cannot reasonably expect that the entity laws of the
chartering government will be applied to the corporation abroad.
The contractarian view conceives of the charter as a private
contract in which the state's role is minimal.13 6 But under basic
contract principles, third parties are not bound by a contract. 13 7
There is no good basis to bind a tort victim to an agreement to
apply a foreign jurisdiction's law if the tort victim was not party
to the agreement. Shareholders' expectations must also be
limited by reality: As this Part has shown, most courts apply
American entity laws to foreign corporations, and thus, under the
current choice-of-law regime, shareholders of foreign corporations
have no reasonable expectation that lex incorporationis will
apply.
The Supreme Court has said that veil-piercing questions fall
outside the internal affairs doctrine. In First National City Bank
v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba ("Bancec"), the
Court pierced the veil of a Cuban credit union that was
established and wholly owned by the Cuban government.13 8 The
Supreme Court specifically addressed the application of the
internal affairs doctrine to the veil-piercing issues in the case:
As a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation
normally determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a

corporation. Application of that body of law achieves the need
136 See Michael
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 782-84 (2006); William W. Bratton, Jr., The
"Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407,
439-42 (1989).
'7 See, e.g., MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Bank of Can., 706 F. Supp. 2d 380, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
138 462 U.S. 611 (1983).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

964

[Vol. 85:925

for certainty and predictability of result while generally
protecting the justified expectations of parties with interests in
the corporation. Different conflicts principles apply, however,
where the rights of third parties external to the corporation are
at issue. 139
The Court went on to reject an approach that required
Cuban law to govern the juridical status of the Cuban entity in
question.140 Bancec should have ended all debate that the
internal affairs doctrine applies to veil piercing, or that the
shareholders' interests in certainty and predictability are of
paramount importance in veil-piercing choice-of-law. However,
courts continue to cite the internal affairs doctrine as they apply
the lex incorporationisto domestic firms.' 4 1 Bancec's reasoning
remains strong, a fact that probably goes a long way toward
explaining why lower courts have been reluctant to adopt lex
incorporationis as the veil-piercing choice-of-law rule for all
firms.
Practical Difficulties in Ascertaining Foreign Veil-Piercing
Laws
A number of courts have endorsed the application of the
internal affairs doctrine to a foreign corporation but then
declined to apply the foreign law because the foreign law had not
been briefed by the parties or was unascertainable.14 2 In other
2.

Id. at 621 (citations omitted).
Id. at 622.
141 See, e.g., Gulley v. Moravec, No. 1:07-cv-788-DFH-TAB, 2008 WL 596002, at
*5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 29, 2008), affd, Whitely v. Moravec, 635 F.3d 308 (7th Cir. 2011).
142See Platten v. HG Berm. Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 128 n.5 (1st Cir. 2006)
(explaining that the district court had originally applied Bermudan law to a
Bermudan corporation and then changed its mind, stating, "[wihere 'there is at least
a reasonable relation between the dispute and the forum whose law has been
selected by the parties, we will forego an independent analysis of the choice-of-law
issue and apply' the state substantive law selected by the parties") (quoting Fed. Ins.
Co. v. Raytheon Co., 426 F.3d 491, 496 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005)); Fen Hin Chon Enters.,
Ltd. v. Porelon, Inc., 874 F.2d 1107, 1115 (6th Cir. 1989) (questioning "whether
Tennessee [veil-piercing] law can or should be applied to these Hong Kong
corporations" and concluding that the petitioner "has made no effort to show that the
requirements of Hong Kong corporate law were not complied with here"); Lehman
Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., No. 94
CIV. 8301 (JFK), 1996 WL 346426, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996) (analyzing alter
ego claim against a Chinese corporation under both Chinese and New York veilpiercing law and hedging about which will apply, noting that the parties had
submitted contradictory expert opinions on Chinese law); EBG Holdings L.L.C. v.
13s
140
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cases, the courts have asserted that the foreign veil-piercing law
was not distinguishable from the relevant domestic law, a
conclusion that is generally not well-supported and probably
reflects the courts' frustration with ascertaining the foreign
law." 3 It can be difficult to ascertain foreign veil-piercing law."
Some foreign nations simply do not permit veil piercing where
American law allows it. The veil-piercing laws of civil law
nations are sometimes not easily translated to claims in
American courts.' In such cases, these nations might be said to
not "recognize" a particular type of veil piercing. If a court
concludes that the foreign jurisdiction rejects veil piercing in
those circumstances, it effectively terminates substantive rights
and remedies that exist under American law, something that
courts may be reluctant to do.
Vredezicht's Gravenhage 109 B.V., No. 3184-VCP, 2008 WL 4057745, at *11 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 2, 2008) (in analyzing personal jurisdictional under an alter-ego theory,
the Delaware Chancery court noted that Dutch alter ego law should apply to a Dutch
limited liability company, but the parties did not brief Dutch law, and thus the
Court would apply Delaware alter ego law).
14 See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 971217, WL 357907, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that Japanese law might apply, but
finding that the Japanese and federal standard "are essentially the same"); Great
Lakes Overseas, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group, Ltd., 990 F.2d 990, 996 (7th
Cir. 1993) (analyzing veil-piercing issues relating to an Australian firm under both
Illinois law and United Kingdom law, in a contract dispute involving a United
Kingdom choice-of-law provision, and concluding that the outcome would be the
same under either law); Phillips v. United Heritage Corp., 319 S.W.3d 156, 168 (Tex.
App. 2010) (declining to decide whether the law of Texas or Turks & Caicos applied
to a veil-piercing claim against the officers and directors of an "exempt company" in
the Turks & Caicos Islands because the disposition of the claim would have been the
same under either law).
14 For example, in PresbyterianChurch of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453
F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), a class action under the federal Alien Tort Statute,
veil-piercing claims were asserted against commercial entities organized under the
laws of the Mauritius, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The District Court
for the Southern District of New York had difficulty ascertaining the proper
standard under the law of the Republic of Mauritius, a small island in the Indian
Ocean. Id. at 681-83. The court found that Mauritian law allowed for the corporate
veil to be pierced "when it can be proved that a company conducts business with the
intent to defraud creditors or as a mere fagade," but noted that there were no
Mauritian court decisions that provided guidance on what it meant to operate as a
facade. Id. at 683. Ultimately, utilizing more guesswork than legal analysis, the
court chose to borrow a definition from English law. Id.
"' See, e.g., Mega Tech Int'l Corp. v. Al-Saghyir Establishment, No. 96 CIV 8711
LBS, 1999 WL 269896, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1999) (noting that Saudi Arabian veilpiercing law does not permit jurisdictional veil-piercing).
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Courts that seek to apply foreign law can face a unique
challenge when that law lacks the equivalent of equitable veilpiercing doctrines. For example, while New York law will allow a
non-signatory to be liable for the breach of a contract on a veilpiercing theory, English law will not.14 6 As another example,
Chinese law does not recognize reverse veil piercing. 147 Two
recent cases further demonstrate how substantive legal
principles of American entity law can be forfeited by the
application of foreign entity law. In Kingdom 5-KR-41, Ltd. v.
Star Cruises, PLC, the Bank of New York sought to pierce the
corporate veil of a Norwegian company in connection with
breach-of-contract claims in District Court for the Southern
District of New York. 148 The contract had a New York choice-oflaw provision, but both parties agreed that Norwegian law
applied to the veil-piercing claim, and the district court applied
Norwegian law.14 9 The choice of law essentially decided the
matter, the court discovered, because "[g]enerally, the concept of
corporate veil piercing is not recognized under Norwegian law." 5 o
The court explained that if veil piercing were "possible" under
Norwegian law, it could only be done if failure to pierce the veil
would be "utilbphirlig"-a very strong word for unfairness that
apparently has no English translation.'
In another case, a plaintiff asked the District Court for the
Southern District of New York to assert personal jurisdiction
over a company chartered by Saudi Arabia on an "alter ego"
theory, essentially asking the court to disregard the juridical
status of a second Saudi Arabian company and impute its
American contacts to the first company.15 The District Court
146See MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 12238/09, 2010 WL 3294302,
at *24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Westchester Cnty. Aug. 19, 2010) (citing expert testimony that
"under English law, only the parties to a contract may be liable for its breach," and
"there are no exceptions to this rule, as there are in New York").
141 See Milliken & Co. v. Haima Group Corp., No. 08-22891-MC, 2010 WL
1286462, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2010) (citing the expert opinion of a Chinese
lawyer).
14 Kingdom 5-KR-41, Ltd. v. Star Cruises, PLC, No. 01 Civ. 2946 (AGS), 2003
WL 262507, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2003).
141 Id. at *2, 4 n.2.
150 Id. at *4.
" Id. at *4 (citing Inkassoservice Advokatfirma Mitsem v. Park Holding v. Park
Holding AS, Rt.-1996-672 (204-96) (Sup. Ct. Norway 1996)).
152 Mega Tech Int'l Corp. v. Al-Saghyir Establishment, No. 96 CIV 8711 LBS,
1999 WL 269896, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1999).
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applied the entity law of the chartering jurisdiction, Saudi
Arabia, to the jurisdictional veil-piercing issue and concluded
that "Saudi Arabian law does not recognize the concept of veilpiercing in these circumstances."1 3 The District Court thus held
that the foreign entity law insulated the Saudi firm from the
reach of the American court's authority on a veil-piercing

theory. 154
The fact that many civil law jurisdictions conceptualize veil
piercing differently than courts in the Anglo-American legal
tradition makes it difficult for American courts to "apply" foreign
laws without concluding that some foreign jurisdictions do not
permit certain types of veil piercing. Unfortunately, such an
approach effectively destroys equitable rights and remedies that
are available under American law. And one might be left to
conclude that incorporating an entity in Norway, or in Saudi
Arabia, insulates shareholders, parent companies, and affiliated
companies from certain American laws.
Agreement of the Parties that American Law Applies
If both parties agree that a particular American
jurisdiction's veil-piercing law should apply to a foreign
corporation, a court often will not engage in an independent
choice-of-law analysis.
This is because the rule in most
jurisdictions is that the parties can agree to a choice-of-law
determination; it also serves the interests of both the parties'
lawyers and the court in keeping the issue within the familiar
3.

153

Id.

Id. The court held that it had personal jurisdiction over the Saudi entity on
another basis. Id. A third example is Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), in which veil-piercing claims were
asserted against a Dutch entity, among others. The District Court found that
"[ulnder Dutch law, the corporate veil may only be pierced to hold the shareholders
of a company liable for claims against the company in limited circumstances which
relate to insolvency and are not relevant to this litigation." Id. at 686. The court then
described the Dutch "doctrine of equation," under which a parent corporation may be
held liable for its subsidiary's misconduct. Id. at 686-87. The court asserted that the
doctrine required the plaintiff to show that "the corporate form has been abused to
avoid a legal obligation." Id. at 687. After finding that the Dutch law had a
"remarkable similarity" to New York law, the court stated that the Dutch Supreme
Court had only once upheld a judgment of liability under the doctrine of equation.
Id. at 687 & n.107. The district court then declined to pierce the veil. Id. at 687.
154
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American legal framework. 15 1 It is, however, a strong rejection of
the contractarian view of the corporation, which holds that a
To
court should enforce the shareholders' choice of law.
for
an
is
no
basis
view,
there
contractarian
adherents of the
American lawyer to bind her client's shareholders to a different
veil-piercing standard than the one they believed they were
agreeing to when they selected the jurisdiction of incorporation.
Thus, although this approach-allowing a foreign corporation's
lawyer to agree to ignore lex incorporationis in a disputecomports with the conflicts law in most jurisdictions, it is in
tension with any notion that the corporate charter reflects a
selection of veil-piercing law by the shareholders.
Entity Law Problems that Span Multiple Nations
Pyramidal ownership arrangements are common in
corporate groups, and they can complicate the veil-piercing
analysis.' 6 In some cases, multiple tiers of corporate ownership
must be pierced to reach an ultimate parent company or
shareholder, and multiple chartering governments are
involved."15 In other cases, entities organized under the laws of
many different sovereign nations form part of the same corporate
group, and a piercing claim asks the court to treat them as a
single entity for some purpose-such as discovery veil piercing.' 8
4.

15 The law in most federal circuits is that a court need not analyze a choice-oflaw issue if the parties agree about the governing law. See, e.g., Texaco A/S (Den.) v.
Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, NJ, 160 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1998) ("'where the
parties have agreed to the application of the forum law, their consent concludes the
choice of law inquiry.'" (quoting Am. Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., 122 F.3d
130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997)). Only the Fifth Circuit for the United States Court of
Appeals routinely engages in a conflicts analysis if the parties do not dispute the
choice of law. See Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 1990).
156Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, & George G. Triantis, Stock
Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual-Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency
Costs of SeparatingControl from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP 295, 299 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000).
151 See, e.g., Playwell Toy, Inc. v. Bureau Veritas Consumer Prods. Servs., Inc.,
No. 03-CV-0704C(SC), 2008 WL 4372654, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008).
us See, e.g., id. (applying Nebraska veil-piercing law to corporations chartered in
Massachusetts, Hong Kong, and France that were alleged to have held themselves
out as a "single global entity"); InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 148-50 (1st
Cir. 2003) (applying federal veil-piercing standard to determine whether a Dutch
entity was the alter ego of two entities chartered in the Cayman Islands).
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In these cases, a rule requiring the application of the law of the
jurisdiction of incorporation makes the veil-piercing inquiry
cumbersome and complicated.
In cases involving such "compound" entity law analysis,
American courts have generally rejected lex incorporationisand
applied the law of a single American jurisdiction. For example,
in 2006, the First Circuit for the United States Court of Appeals
addressed a veil-piercing claim against a Pennsylvania
corporation, which was wholly owned by a Delaware corporation,
which was wholly owned by a Dutch corporation, which was
wholly owned by a Bermudan corporation. 1s9 If the court had
chosen to apply the veil-piercing laws of the jurisdictions of
incorporation, it would have needed to analyze each of the four
layers of corporate ownership according to each nation's separate
laws. Instead, the court took a more practical approach: It
simply applied Massachusetts law to each entity in the
organizational pyramid.16 0
The opposite approach, requiring the satisfaction of multiple
nations' veil-piercing standards, would allow corporate parties to
manipulate choice of law because it would permit the most
restrictive jurisdiction's veil-piercing law to control. Thus, a
party could easily insulate itself from veil piercing in the United
States by creating a pyramidal ownership arrangement in which
a single parent tier is incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction with
very high veil-piercing standards.
Such a regime would
contribute to the risk of a global entity law "race to the bottom,"
which is discussed in more detail in Part IV(B)(2) below.
To sum up, there is good evidence of a double standard:
Courts apply one choice-of-law rule to veil-piercing claims
against domestic firms, but they balk at applying the same rule
to foreign firms. This double standard reflects an implicit
recognition by courts that the principles underlying the rule for
159 Platten v. H.G. Berm. Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 123 (1st Cir. 2006). In
footnote five, the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals noted the
choice-of-law issue, explained that the district court had originally applied
Bermudan law, and then changed its mind, concluding that "where 'there is at least
a reasonable relation between the dispute and the forum whose law has been
selected by the parties, we will forego an independent analysis of the choice-of-law
issue and apply' the state substantive law selected by the parties." Id. at 128 n.5
(quoting Fed. Ins. Co. v. Raytheon Co., 426 F.3d 491, 496 n.2 (1st Cir.2005)).

16oSee Platten, 437 F.3d at 127.
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And the
domestic corporations are analytically unsound.
different rule for foreign firms is justified by some courts by the
practical difficulties of applying lex incorporationis to them.
Whatever the reason for the double standard, its existence
should prompt us to reexamine the grounds for applying either
state law or foreign law to questions about the juridical status of
foreign firms in American courts.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT CHOICE-OF-LAW REGIME
Part II showed that American courts apply different choiceof-law principles to domestic and foreign entities in questions of
corporate form. Veil-piercing analysis of domestic firms is guided
by the internal affairs doctrine and governed by the law of the
jurisdiction of incorporation. But veil-piercing analysis of foreign
firms is different. Instead of applying the law of the foreign
chartering jurisdiction, most courts will analyze the foreign
corporate form by applying the law of some American state.
Even federal courts in the Southern District of New York, which
hear many international disputes and have shown the greatest
commitment to applying the entity law of the foreign chartering
jurisdiction, can be found regularly applying domestic entity law
standards to foreign entities."' All of this amounts to a double
standard in the way courts analyze the separate legal personhood
of domestic and foreign corporations.
This Part critiques the existing choice-of-law regime. First,
it criticizes the double standard itself by highlighting its
unfairness and economic costs to foreign firms. The current
regime discriminates against foreign business entities because it
allows domestic firms to enjoy a predictable choice of law but
subjects foreign firms to uncertainty. As a result of this
uncertainty, foreign firms absorb agency costs that domestic
firms are spared.
Next, this Part argues that there are significant problems
both with a choice-of-law regime that applies the entity law of
the foreign chartering jurisdiction to a foreign company, and with
one that applies the entity law of an American state. In addition
to noting the important practical problems that Part II identified
as contributing to the choice-of-law double standard, this Part
161

See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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argues that there are other significant problems with applying
the law of one or more foreign jurisdictions in a veil-piercing
analysis. For example, the rule of lex incorporationiswill not
resolve the choice-of-law inquiry for treaty-chartered firms. And
enforcement of foreign entity law risks creating a global "race to
the bottom" in which foreign jurisdictions compete to offer
investors the most favorable laws at the expense of everyone else.
This Part argues that the double standard we see at work in
most jurisdictions actually reflects a better-but still
problematic-approach in applying the entity law of one of fifty
American states to a foreign firm. The use of domestic law in
such cases resolves some practical problems, such as the need to
apply multiple foreign jurisdictions' laws, and it eliminates the
potential for an entity law "race to the bottom." However, such
an approach does not reduce the unfairness and economic costs to
foreign firms of a double standard because domestic firms
continue to enjoy the certainty and predictability of the lex
incorporationisrule. Moreover, state entity laws are shadowed
by Dormant Commerce Clause constraints that prohibit states
from "discriminating" against out-of-state businesses. These
constraints prevent the states from treating out-of-state firms
differently from in-state firms, even where such treatment might
Thus, for example, state veil-piercing laws
be warranted.
sometimes provide greater shareholder liability protection for
foreign closely-held firms than the foreign chartering government
would provide. In such cases, state law protects the shareholders
of the foreign entities at the potential expense of domestic
interests.
The Unfairness and Economic Costs of a Double Standard
American corporate law places a high value on economic
efficiency. 162 Yet the choice-of-law double standard identified

A.

The myriad of cases that consider economic efficiency in corporate law
matters include, for example: Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C., 638 F.3d
1072, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yaw v. Talley, No. 12882, 1994 WL 89019, *8
(Del. Ch. 1994)) ("efficient use of corporate resources" in the investigation of claims
in demand letters); NoDAK Bancorporation v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1422-23 (8th
Cir. 1993) (efficiency in consolidation or merger transactions); and RCM Sec. Fund,
Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1335 (2d Cir. 1991) ("the elimination of dissidence
that reduces efficiency" as a "proper business purpose"). It is not surprising that
courts place great value on economic efficiency in matters of business, since they
162
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in this Article creates economic inefficiency because of
Investors in foreign
the information costs of uncertainty.
corporations face uncertain risks in American courts because
they do not know what jurisdiction's veil-piercing laws will apply
to them. They face uncertainty about whether they will be
subject to the personal jurisdiction of a particular state's courts,
or whether a plaintiff can successfully serve them with legal
process to get at the company. They face uncertainty about
whether a shareholder or parent company can be bound by an
entity's contracts, or whether it may be held to stand in a
principal-agent relationship with the corporation's agents. In
short, they face uncertainty with respect to all types of veil
piercing.
In response to all this uncertainty, investors in foreign firms
must engage in more intensive, and more costly, monitoring of
the corporation's managers. They may also incur agency costs in
monitoring the entity laws of many different jurisdictions,
because all are potentially applicable to the firm. Because of the
risk of shareholder liability, this uncertainty may deter potential
investors from choosing to invest in foreign corporations that
operate in American streams of commerce and face unpredictable
veil-piercing laws.
By contrast, American firms enjoy the certainty and
predictability of lex incorporationisfor matters of corporate form
when they operate anywhere in the United States. And
American corporations facing veil-piercing analysis abroad
generally do not face the uncertainty of fifty potentially
applicable standards because most nations that have cognizable
entity law have formulated it at the national level.1 3 Thus,
American firms enjoy an entity law advantage both at home and
abroad. Not only is this advantage unfair-and in potential
violation of foreign firms' due process rights,'64 as well as in
violation of provisions in some treaties that require foreign

strongly value efficiency in their own business, the administration of justice. See,
e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155
F.3d 331, 343-44 (4th Cir. 1998) (analyzing whether a putative class action is "the
most economical and efficient means of litigation").
163 China, for example, set its veil-piercing standards at the national level in its
2006 Company Law.
'6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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businesses to be treated on equal terms with American firms" 'but it puts foreign companies at an economic disadvantage. The
entire regime effectively discourages international commerce.
B.

Applying the Law of the Foreign CharteringJurisdiction

There are a great many reasons that courts should not
choose the lex incorporationis to govern entity law questions
concerning a foreign-chartered business entity. Some of these
reasons, as we saw above in Part II, already appear to form the
basis of a widespread double standard in American choice of law.
As discussed above in Part II, some of these reasons already
appear to form the basis of a widespread double standard
Moreover, applying the lex
in American choice of law.
incorporationis to veil-piercing questions involving tiered
ownership arrangements or corporate groups that span multiple
foreign jurisdictions can involve the application of the laws of
four, five, or even more foreign governments. Since there is
evidence that veil-piercing cases are increasingly involving such
complex, tiered ownership arrangements and complex corporate
groups, the lex incorporationisis likely to become increasingly
disfavored by courts.
In addition to these factors, several others argue against a
choice-of-law rule that calls for the application of the law of a
foreign chartering government in veil-piercing inquiries. Treatychartered corporations are not created within a single sovereign's
legal system, and thus the rule of lex incorporationisprovides no
guidance for how to resolve a veil-piercing matter involving a
treaty-chartered entity. Moreover, allowing shareholders to
choose which nation's veil-piercing law will apply to them
advances the shareholders' interests at the expense of third
parties, and may contribute to a global "race to the bottom" in
entity law.
Finally, the benefits of allowing shareholders to choose
which veil-piercing law will apply to them may be less significant
than the benefits of allowing shareholders to select other aspects
of corporate law, at least in the global context, because veil
piercing reflects judge-made, equitable analysis that is insulated
165 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art.
XXII, Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063.
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from political pressure at the federal court level, where most
cases involving foreign firms will be brought. Advocates of a
corporate "law market"-who want courts to enforce
shareholders' choice of corporate law by enforcing the law of the
jurisdiction of incorporation-argue that protecting shareholders'
choice of law fosters competition among corporate law
jurisdictions, and that this competition serves to optimize those
laws. But federal courts are unlikely to respond to pressure from
Even if federal
interest groups to "optimize" veil-piercing law.'
courts were to respond to such pressure, they would likely find it
one-sided, favoring corporate interests, and thus it would be
unlikely to result in optimized veil-piercing law.
The Treaty-Chartered Entity
As discussed in Part III above, treaty-chartered entities are
formed by international agreement and are not organized under
the laws of any particular nation. There is no clear choice of law
for veil-piercing analysis to be applied to such entities, and lex
incorporationisdoes not apply, since there is no jurisdiction of
incorporation. A court engaged in a veil-piercing dispute over a
treaty-chartered entity would, theoretically, have no choice but to
engage in an interest-balancing analysis to determine which
jurisdiction's veil-piercing law governs. However, to date, no
court has addressed this emerging choice-of-law issue.
1.

The "Race to the Bottom"
An extensive academic debate exists about the corporate
"race to the bottom" among American states. According to the
"race to the bottom" theory, states compete against each other to
"sell" corporate law to firm managers."' States seeking to drum
up revenue from corporate sources compete to attract firms by
offering increasingly management-friendly corporate laws.'16
2.

See infra Part III.B.3.
See Daniel L.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race
to the Top/Bottom, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 384 (2005) (discussing the "race to
the bottom" theory).
168 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware,83 YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974).
16

167
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Managers move their firms to these jurisdictions and take
advantage of lax laws by appropriating wealth from the firms
they manage to themselves.1 69
A countervailing theory, sometimes called the "race to the
top," has commanded support in the corporate law academy. 17 0
This theory argues that instead of hurting investors, competition
incentivizes managers to offer investor-friendly corporate
governance, and corporate laws evolve to favor investor
interests.171 Proponents of the "race to the top" contend that
Delaware dominates state incorporations because it offers
wealth-maximizing corporate law for investors. 7 2 Mark Roe has
made an important contribution to the debate by arguing that
the real "race" is between the states and the federal government,
and that it is the threat of federal regulation of corporations that
keeps the states from adopting abusive laws.
The routine enforcement of foreign entity laws by American
courts risks fostering a global "race to the bottom" in entity law.
The main reason is investor demand: As the advocates for the
"race to the top" have shown, competition allows investors to call
the shots. 174 Since strict entity law protections favor investors,
investors will seek them out. In fact, there is already evidence
that information about the relative ease or difficulty of piercing
the corporate veil under various American state laws is used by
business managers to make strategic incorporation decisions.175
s See id. at 668-69.
See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977).
"' See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
170

STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 4-5 (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 2 (1993); Winter, supra note 170.
172

See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2491, 2497-98

(1995).

" Id. at 2498 (arguing that Delaware has "good reason to fear federal
preemption" of corporate law matters, and this keeps Delaware law in line).
174 See id. at 2497.
" See Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 123, at 855 (noting that a Nevada firm has
relied on Robert Thompson's empirical findings about the ease or difficulty of
piercing the corporate veil to persuade companies to incorporate in Nevada instead
of California); Jens Dammann & Matthias Schindeln, The IncorporationChoices of
Privately Held Corporations, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79, 79 (2011) (finding
"statistically significant and robust evidence that corporations are more likely to
migrate away from states where the risk of veil piercing is high"); cf. Roe, supra note
172, at 2527 (noting that section 630 of the New York Business Corporations Law,
which makes the ten largest shareholders of certain New York corporations
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Another reason to worry about a global entity law "race to
the bottom" is the lack of a global supervisory authority to step in
if the law evolves in an undesirable direction. Unlike in the
American system, where the federal government can act to
preempt flawed state corporate laws, the global "market" for law
lacks a supreme authority. There is no international institution
with the power to stop entity laws from evolving across
jurisdictions to favor investor interests at the expense of others,
such as creditors, tort victims, contractual partners, and
governments. Legislatures and courts should be wary of the
potential for an entity law "race to the bottom" when they
consider whether a rule favoring the law of a foreign chartering
government serves American interests.
3.

The Limited Benefit of Jurisdictional Competition
Because veil-piercing standards are judge-made, they are not
subject to jurisdictional competition in the same way that most
corporate law is. Advocates of the internal affairs doctrine and
the contractarian model of the firm often suggest that when
shareholders select a jurisdiction in which to incorporate, they
are "consuming" law in a sort of "law market.""'
These
commentators typically include veil-piercing doctrine within the
set of corporate laws that are selected by shareholders in this
market-driven process.17 7
However, because veil-piercing law is almost exclusively
judge-made and equitable, a state's veil-piercing law may be
slower to respond to political pressures than corporate laws made
by legislatures. And state judges, many of whom are elected, are
less politically insulated than federal judges, who have lifetime
tenure. Thus, we might expect to see that veil-piercing doctrines
fashioned by federal judges are less favorable toward corporate
interests than those fashioned by state judges, and there is some
evidence to suggest that federal veil-piercing standards are more
lenient.17 8 If state judges are more politically insulated than
personally liable for employee wages, "has been described as 'the single most
important reason why New York shareholders decide to incorporate in Delaware' ").
176 See, e.g., O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 52, at 3-5.
177 See, e.g., id. at
5.
178 See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 9, § 3:2 n.22 (asserting that federal
veilpiercing standards are more lenient than state veil-piercing standards).
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legislatures, and federal judges are more politically insulated
than state judges, there is little basis to believe that federal
judges, applying the equitable veil-piercing doctrines of various
states and foreign nations in diversity cases, will optimize veilpiercing law, or that jurisdictional competition will be fostered
among the various judges who craft these highly fact-specific,
equitable standards.
For all these reasons, the law of the foreign chartering
jurisdiction is a poor choice for governing the juridical status of
foreign firms in American courts. In addition to increasinglycommon tiered ownership arrangements and corporate groups
that span multiple jurisdictions, another innovation in corporate
organization-the treaty-chartered entity-requires an exception
to the lex incorporationisrule. The risk of an entity law "race to
the bottom" is real and must be guarded against. And a global
"market" for entity law is unlikely to result in entity law
advances that optimize the balance of power between corporate
participants and other people, organizations, and governments.
C.

Applying State Law

Most American courts employ a choice-of-entity-law double
standard that requires the application of the law of an American
state to a foreign entity.' This choice of law is preferable to
applying the entity law of the foreign chartering government for
several reasons. First, it eliminates many of the practical
problems, such as the difficulty of ascertaining the proper foreign
law standard, the need to apply multiple foreign governments'
laws where tiered ownership arrangements span multiple
jurisdictions, and the problem of the treaty-chartered entity. It
also forecloses an international entity law "race to the bottom," in
which foreign jurisdictions compete to offer the most shareholderfriendly entity laws at the expense of third parties around the
globe.
However, this Part argues that there are significant
drawbacks to a choice-of-law regime that applies one rule to
domestic firms and a different rule to foreign firms, even if this
approach results in the application of American state law to both
17'See Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International
Securities Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 61, 66 (1999).
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types of firms. The double standard itself has significant costs
for foreign firms that wish to do business with American parties.
Moreover, there are constitutional constraints on the
flexibility with which domestic state laws can address the
breadth and variety of foreign business entities. The Dormant
Commerce Clause places limits on a state's regulation of out-ofstate firms, and these limits extend to the regulation of corporate
personhood and juridical status in the state's own courts.
Differences Among State Veil-Piercing Laws
Commentators often downplay or fail to recognize the real
differences that exist among state veil-piercing standards.
Because state laws vary in some important ways, 180 the threat to
a foreign firm of being held to fifty or more different state veilpiercing standards is significant. It means that foreign firms
must monitor multiple state standards, and their own activity,
A choice-of-entity-law regime that favors the
with care.
application of state law to a foreign firm has agency costs for the
foreign firm because of these information and monitoring costs.
And since American courts uniformly apply the entity law of the
state of incorporation to domestic firms, such a choice-of-entitylaw regime perpetuates a double standard that puts foreign firms
at an economic and legal disadvantage.
Commentators have noted many differences among state
veil-piercing laws. For example, the veil-piercing doctrines of
Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania are considered
particularly favorable to shareholders desiring protection from
liability.181 Massachusetts is also known to have a "somewhat
more 'strict'" respect for the corporate form. 182 In contrast, the
veil-piercing doctrines of Texas and California are generally
characterized as more easily satisfied.18 3 In 2009, a federal
1.

" See, e.g., Crespi, supra note 46, at 87-88.
181Id.

at 94; see PRESSER, supra note 9,

§§

2.8, 2.33, 2.34; see also Yoder v.

Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Delaware may require
somewhat more [than Colorado] to pierce a corporate veil."); Thompson, supra note
6, at 1052 ("As a group, the New York decisions seem somewhat more restrictive on
piercing than cases from the rest of the country.").
182 Birbara v. Locke, 99 F.3d 1233, 1238 (1st Cir. 1996).
18 Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1220; see also PRESSER, supra note 9, § 2.45 ("Texas '[is]
somewhat more lenient than other jurisdictions in disregarding the corporate
entity.' ").
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bankruptcy court that compared the veil-piercing laws of New
York and Colorado found that they were not interchangeable,
and identified a number of differences.* Professor Thompson's
1991 empirical study analyzed veil-piercing cases by state and
found widely varying rates of successful piercing."' Almost
eighty percent of veil-piercing cases that applied Kansas law
resulted in successful piercing; the rate for cases applying
Delaware law was zero. 86 Among the jurisdictions with the most
veil-piercing cases, rates of successful piercing ranged from
thirty-five percent in New York, to forty-five percent in
California.'"' Professor Thompson's work suggests that there
may be real practical differences among state veil-piercing tests.
State entity law standards vary in some specific ways. One
is the requirement of fraud. Most states require fraud to be
established before the veil will be pierced, but a minority of
jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia, do not."8 "
Maryland stands alone among the states with its unique
In the late nineteenth
approach to one-person corporations. 8
century, Maryland courts took a stand against the majority view
of states by holding that a one-person corporation should not be
recognized as separate from its owner.9 o To this day, in certain
contexts, this approach persists in Maryland, and thus, for
184 Pereira v. Grecogas Ltd. (In re Saba Enters., Inc.), 421 B.R. 626,
651
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
I See Thompson, supra note 6, at 1051 tbl. 6.
186 Id. It is important to note that the sample sizes for the two states were
different-nineteen for Kansas law (of which fifteen resulted in successful piercing)
and eleven for Delaware law (of which none resulted in successful piercing). Id.
Thompson himself points out that the small number of cases in each jurisdiction
make generalizations difficult. See id. It is also likely that Delaware's role as the
jurisdiction of choice for widely-held corporations means that a higher proportion of
its veil-piercing cases involved widely-held corporations, which better withstand
veil-piercing scrutiny. See id. at 1052-53.

1s' See id. at 1051.

188 Compare TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 21.223-26 (West 2011) (requiring
proof of actual fraud), with Groves v. Dakota Printing Servs., Inc., 371 N.W.2d 59,
62-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Plroof of strict common law fraud is not required,
but, rather, evidence that the corporate entity has been operated as a constructive
fraud or in an unjust manner must be presented.") (citing White v. Jorgenson 322
N.W.2d 607, 608 (Minn. 1982)), and Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 99 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (in a contract case, the "'errant' party" need not have "engaged in
anything amounting to fraud" to justify piercing the veil).
19 See Swift v. Smith, 5 A. 534, 539 (Md. 1886).
190

See id.
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example, a mortgage executed by the sole shareholder of a oneperson corporation on the corporation's behalf is enforceable
against him personally.1 91
Other differences among the states involve relatively recent
veil-piercing innovations, such as reverse veil piercing and a
subsidiary's effort to pierce its own veil. 19 2 Some states allow
"outsider reverse [veil] piercing," in which a creditor of a
shareholder who seeks to disregard the corporate form to obtain
corporate assets in satisfaction of the shareholder's debts, and
other states do not. 193 Some jurisdictions allow a subsidiary
corporation to pierce its own corporate veil and reach its parent
company, while other state courts reject such an action. 194 And a
minority of states allows certain types of veil-piercing claims to
go to the jury, a procedure that no doubt affects the likelihood of
successful piercing."9 s
All of these differences among state veil-piercing laws mean
that a rule that favors the application of state entity law to
foreign firms subjects foreign firms to real uncertainty and thus
to agency costs. In such a choice-of-entity-law regime, domestic
firms will continue to enjoy the certainty and predictability of lex
incorporationis, while foreign firms will be unfairly burdened
with the costs of uncertainty.

191 See id. at 539; The Bellona Company's Case, 3 Bland, 442, 442 (Semble) (Md.
1831); 6 MARYLAND LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA: CORPORATIONS § 210 (2010). Although
Swift remains good law, it has not been cited since 1933.
192 LFC Mktg. Group, Inc., v. Loomis, 8 P.3d 841, 846 (Nev. 2000).
' See Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate
Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 37 (1990). Reverse veil-piercing occurs when the
corporate form is disregarded to hold the corporation liable for the shareholder's
debts. See id. "Insider" reverse veil-piercing cases involve a controlling insider who
seeks to disregard the corporate form to "avail the insider of corporate claims
against third parties," or to shelter corporate assets from the claims of third parties.
Id.
*194
See, e.g., RDM Holdings, Ltd. v. Cont'l. Plastics Co., 762 N.W.2d 529, 545
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that a subsidiary may not bring an alter ego claim
against its parent under Michigan law).
195

See Gevurtz, supra note 22, at 905.
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The Limits of State Regulation of Out-of-State Commercial
Entities
A regime that applies domestic state entity laws to foreign
firms has another problem: It is governing a critical facet of
international commerce with laws designed to address parochial
state interests, in a system that largely constrains state
lawmakers from treating out-of-state firms differently from instate firms. State judge-made veil-piercing standards developed
in the twentieth century to address the juridical status of local
business entities. For example, no American state distinguishes
with its entity laws among widely-held, closely-held, and oneperson corporations. Thus all three types of firms are treated
This practice puts the
identically under veil-piercing law.'
courts at odds with the political branches in some respects; for
example, Congress has enacted federal sentencing guidelines
that treat the shareholder of a closely-held corporation as the
entity's alter ego."' It also puts the states at odds with the laws
of many foreign nations, which distinguish among different types
of business entities with their veil-piercing laws."es Thus,
although state veil-piercing laws have developed in conformity
with the laws and practices concerning state-chartered
corporations, they do not always square well with the laws and
practices governing corporations chartered abroad.
Importantly, there are constitutional limits on the ability of
the states to regulate out-of-state companies, and these limits
extend to laws regulating the companies' juridical statuses. The
states are prohibited by the Dormant Commerce Clause from
discriminating against out-of-state entities by, for example,
2.

196 Thompson, supra note 6, at 1041-42 (stating that almost all corporations
statutes ignore the idea of piercing the veil and that the model idea behind corporate
liability is that shareholders of a corporation, unless otherwise noted or by its their
own doing, are not liable for the acts or debts of the corporation).
19 The United States Sentencing Commission has noted that "[flor practical
purposes, most closely held organizations are the alter egos of their ownermanagers." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C3.4 cmt. 2 (2011). For
purposes of this provision, the individual shareholder must own at least five percent
of the corporation's stock. Id. § 8C3.4.
' See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (
[Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. of the 10th Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) 2006
China Law LEXIS 7956, available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI-EN/Laws/
lawen-infojsp?docid=50878.
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regulating the corporate governance of out-of-state firms, even if
they operate principally in-state. 199 This prohibition extends to
regulating these firms' juridical statuses in a way that is less
favorable than the state's regulation of the juridical statuses of
in-state entities. Moreover, the Dormant Commerce Clause may
limit the ability of the states to regulate the juridical status of
entities in a way that would depart from the general approach of
other states if they would "burden" interstate commerce by doing
SO. 200
The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from
discriminating against interstate or foreign commerce. 20 1 It
effectively prohibits states from applying different entity law
standards to in-state companies and out-of-state companies
operating in interstate or foreign commerce.2 0 2 For example, the
clause has featured prominently in a line of cases concerning the
right of an "unqualified" out-of-state corporation-one that has
not complied with a state's laws authorizing it to do business in
the state-to have access to the state's courts.2 0s Under this line
of cases, the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits a state from
using its courts to reject an out-of-state company as a legal
person merely because the company is not authorized under state

..See, e.g., Rocket Acquisition Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., No. CIV 071278-PHX-MHM, 2007 WL 2422082, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2007) (rejecting Arizona
antitakeover statutes that regulated voting rights of out-of-state firms
headquartered in Arizona on Commerce Clause grounds). The out-of-state entities
must be operating in interstate or foreign commerce, not merely in intrastate
commerce, for the Commerce Clause to apply. See id.
21 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstowne, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 389
(1994) ("It is well settled that actions are within the domain of the Commerce Clause
if they burden interstate commerce or impede its free flow."); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937).
.0.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) ("The principal objects of [D]ormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate
commerce."). Discrimination, in the Commerce Clause context, means "differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former
and burdens the latter." Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511
U.S. 93, 99 (1994). For a discussion of the Commerce Clause limitations on state
choice-of-law doctrines, see generally Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as
a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1971).
202 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
"02See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
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law to conduct business in the state.2 04 These cases effectively
command state courts to recognize the juridical status of an outof-state business, and to enforce its juridical rights-such as
property and contractual rights-even if it has failed to comply
with state laws and therefore cannot legally operate in the
state.205

The Commerce Clause has also limited the ability of states to
regulate the in-state conduct of out-of-state firms. For example,
the Supreme Court struck down an Ohio statute that tolled the
statute of limitations for contract or fraud claims for any period
that a corporation was not "present" in the state. 2 06 To be
"present" in Ohio for purposes of the statute, an out-of-state
corporation had to appoint an agent for service of process, which
would have subjected the corporation to the general jurisdiction
of the state's courts.2 07 The Supreme Court held that Ohio's rule,
which withheld the benefits of a statute of limitations to an outof-state corporation because it failed to appoint an agent for
service of process, did not advance Ohio's "legitimate sphere of
regulation" but rather subjected interstate commerce to
"substantial restraints." 20 8 The Court reasoned that Ohio could
not justify its statute as a means of protecting its residents from
corporations who commit tortious acts within the state but later
withdraw from the jurisdiction, since the state's long-arm statute
would generally permit service on such out-of-state firms.209
Under the Court's analysis, the Commerce Clause did not permit
Ohio to protect its citizens from the difficulties of serving an
evasive, out-of-state entity under such circumstances.
A key facet of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
its tendency to force all state laws concerning interstate or
foreign commerce to converge.
For example, in Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, the Supreme Court

held that Iowa could not prohibit sixty-five foot double trucks
204 See, e.g., Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 34 (1974); Radio
WHKW, Inc., v. Yarber, 838 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (5th Cir. 1988); cf. Neth.
Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 732 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing this
issue in connection with a New York "door closing" statute).
205 See Allenberg Cotton Co., 419 U.S. at 33-34.
206 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 894 (1988).
207

208

Id. at 889.
Id. at 891.

209 Id. at 894.
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from its highways, because its law was "out of step with the laws
of all other Midwestern and Western States" and therefore
"substantially burden [ed] the interstate flow of goods by truck."210
The Dormant Commerce Clause likewise imposes a strange sort
of standardization over a state's treatment of in-state and out-ofstate firms, even when differences between the two types have
real consequences. As a result of Dormant Commerce Clause
limits, all state laws regulate the juridical status of foreign
business organizations in the same way that they regulate instate organizations. And no state law could do the following
without encroaching on Commerce Clause limits:
* Set a lower bar for piercing the corporate veil of a
foreign corporation owned and controlled by a single
American citizen than for other types of corporations;
* Create a rule rejecting the juridical status of a
corporation organized under a foreign government's
laws, where the foreign government has created the
entity with the express requirement that it not operate
within its own territory;2 1 '
* Put the initial burden of proof on a foreign corporation
(but not an in-state one) to prove that it is a separate
legal entity with limited liability under the laws of the
foreign government that chartered it;
* Eliminate the fraud requirement in a veil-piercing
analysis applied to any firm chartered by a foreign
government that does not require fraud in its own veilpiercing standard.
The merits of any of these rules are debatable. The point is that
by prohibiting states from "discriminating" against out-of-state
firms, the Dormant Commerce Clause discourages states from
experimenting with veil-piercing laws that may better address
developments in corporate law around the world.
There is a real question as to whether Commerce Clause
constraints have contributed to stagnant veil-piercing law. Veilpiercing doctrines have been criticized for years by courts and
commentators, but have undergone virtually no changes. One
improvement that states might make, for example, would be to
210 Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981); see also
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959).
211 Such a rule might also encroach on the dormant foreign relations power.
See
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968); supra Part IV.C.
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develop different veil-piercing standards for widely-held, closelyheld, and one-person corporations, as a number of foreign nations
now do.
Some legal scholars have proposed liability for
controlling shareholders,2 1 2 and others for all shareholders of
closely-held corporations.2 13 Many courts and commentators
would no doubt support the revision of veil-piercing standards
along any of these lines, but such revisions would treat some outof-state firms differently from in-state firms, and put a state's
laws "out of step" with the laws of neighboring states, making the
laws vulnerable to a Commerce Clause challenge.
In contrast to the stagnant approach of the American states,
foreign nations that have written twenty-first century veilpiercing laws have not taken a one-size-fits-all approach. For
example, China's 2006 revisions to its Company Law provides a
veil-piercing standard for one-person corporations that is much
easier to satisfy than the standard applicable to other types of
Yet, because entity law is state law, and the
companies.21
Dormant Commerce Clause limits how the states can regulate
the legal personhood of out-of-state firms, there is little chance
that any state will change its law, or that the new law would
survive a constitutional challenge if one did. In the meantime,
paradoxically, Chinese one-person firms enjoy greater veilpiercing protections in American courts than they would enjoy in

See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 151, 151 (1991) (arguing for controlling-person shareholder
liability in cases brought under CERCLA); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based
Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203,
1203 (2002) (arguing that shareholders with a capacity to control corporate activity
should be fully responsible for corporate torts and statutory violations).
213 See, e.g., Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock, & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic
Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117, 148
(1980) (arguing for unlimited liability for small, closely-held corporations); Note,
Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76
YALE L.J. 1190, 1196 (1967) (arguing for unlimited liability for closely-held
corporations). But see David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and
Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1569 (1991) (finding that "in some circumstances
limited liability may be more justified in closely held firms than in widely held
firms").
214 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (
Ai)
[Company Law
of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the 10th
Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) 2006 China Law LEXIS
7956, available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI EN/Laws/law-en info.jsp?docid=
50878.
212
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Chinese courts because, as Part III above showed, American
courts are unlikely to apply Chinese veil-piercing laws to Chinese
firms.
All of this suggests that the limits on the ability of the states
to regulate the foreign corporate form are significant. They are
limited by their local interests, of course; state veil-piercing law
developed to apply to in-state firms and to balance the interests
of in-state actors. But they are also limited by the Dormant
Commerce Clause to treat in-state and out-of-state firms
similarly, and to keep their laws similar to the laws of other
states, so as not to "burden" interstate or foreign commerce.
These limits should cause us to ask whether national
governmental interests require greater power and flexibility in
adapting entity laws to the realities of modern global commerce.
The analysis above suggests that the application of the law
of an American state is preferable to the application of foreign
law in questions concerning the juridical status of foreign
corporations. Yet the application of state law creates significant
problems. One problem is agency costs for foreign firms that
cannot be certain which state's law will be applied to them. A
choice-of-law regime that allows the juridical status of domestic
firms to be governed by the law of the state of incorporation, but
requires American law to govern foreign firms' juridical status,
creates a problematic double standard and reduces economic
efficiency for foreign firms. Another problem is the inability of
state law to distinguish between in-state and out-of-state
companies due to Dormant Commerce Clause restraints, and the
related concern that state veil-piercing doctrines are likely to be
fashioned with parochial state interests, and certainly local
businesses, in mind.
But the application of foreign law presents a more troubling
picture. Once we understand that entity law issues implicate
third party interests and are outside the internal affairs doctrine,
there is no basis to enforce shareholder choice of entity law at the
expense of third parties. And the benefits of jurisdictional
competition, heralded by advocates of global choice-of-law, are
unlikely to develop where the law is applied by federal judges
who are insulated from political pressure. There are difficulties
in ascertaining veil-piercing standards in some jurisdictions, as
well as the problem of translating American veil-piercing
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Corporate groups and
concepts to foreign legal systems.
pyramidal ownership arrangements make the application of the
foreign chartering nation particularly cumbersome and even
prone to abuse. And this leads to a final problem-the possibility
that enforcing the veil-piercing law of the jurisdiction of
incorporation will prompt a global "race to the bottom" in which
nations compete to offer increasingly restrictive veil-piercing
laws that favor corporate interests at the expense of everyone
else.
As all this suggests, both choices of law available to courts in
the current paradigm-the law of a foreign chartering
government under lex incorporationis,and the law of one of fifty
American states, chosen through an approach that balances
governmental interests-have significant problems. Neither
choice succeeds at providing foreign firms with a fair,
predictable, and economically-efficient rule that can be applied
with practical ease, and that beneficially regulates intersecting
streams of American and foreign commerce. The next Part
proposes a choice of law that better optimizes these factors:
federal law.
V. THE CASE FOR FEDERAL ENTITY LAW FOR FOREIGN ENTITIES
Part IV above showed that there are significant drawbacks
to the current conflicts-of-law paradigm and its choice of state
and foreign entity laws. This Part argues that the current
paradigm fails to acknowledge the potential applicability-and,
in fact, the already-existing role-of federal law in regulating the
juridical status of foreign business entities. This Part begins by
establishing that the federal courts already create and apply
federal, common-law veil-piercing standards in a range of
situations. It then argues that a number of bilateral treaties
address the juridical status of foreign entities in American courts
and thus "federalize" the issue for covered entities. As we shall
see, some treaties explicitly contemplate that American judges
will pierce the corporate veil of a foreign nation's entities in
specific circumstances. Since treaties are federal law, their
interpretation by the federal courts supersedes state law.
This Part then explains how uniform, federal veil-piercing
standards for foreign-chartered entities successfully address the
problems posed by the current double standard. It argues that
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the authorization for federal entity law standards for foreign
corporations should be understood to arise from three sources.
The first is the existence of the bilateral treaties addressing some
foreign firms' juridical status. This does not end the matter,
however, because the United States has signed such treaties with
only slightly more than a dozen nations.15 With other nationsincluding some, like Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, that are
popular jurisdictions for the incorporation of firms that operate
in the United States 2 1 6-the authority for federal judge-made
entity law is less obvious. Nonetheless, such authority should be
understood to arise from the Constitution's commitment of
matters relating to foreign commerce and foreign relations to the
federal government: "[T]he United States act[s] through a single
government with unified and adequate national power" in
matters concerning foreign trade and international relations.2 17
Where questions about the integration of foreign business
entities in our legal system arise, they implicate both foreign
trade and international relations, and the federal government
unquestionably has the power to address them.2 18
The existence of Dormant Commerce Clause limits on the
states' ability to regulate the juridical status of out-of-state firms
creates a clear federal governmental interest in this area. Our
constitution authorizes federal law, the Supreme Court has held,
where the "international nature of the controversy makes it
inappropriate for state law to control." 219 The states are not free
to craft any sort of entity law applicable to foreign companies;
rather, they are prohibited from "discriminating against" out-ofstate companies.2 20 The mere fact of such a limit threatens the
federal interest in flexible, twenty-first-century entity laws
governing the interface of foreign entities with American
See discussion infra Part V.B.
John D. McKinnon, Lower-Tax Shores Draw U.S. Firms, WALL ST. J,
(June 24, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230490600457
6367451807842440.html.
217 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (quoting Bd. of
Trs. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)).
218 See discussion infra Part V.C.
219 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981);
accord Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 27 (2004) ("[Wlhen state interests
cannot be accommodated without defeating a federal interest . .. then federal
substantive law should govern.").
220See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
215

216 See
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commerce. The Constitution should not be read to allow state
law to govern a matter with a strong foreign relations dimension
if the exercise of state law cuts off a whole range of lawmaking
options.
This Part engages the debate among courts and
commentators over the legitimacy of federal common law and
argues that veil-piercing standards for foreign entities are an
example of valid federal judge-made law. It points out that there
are already many areas of federal judge-made law, and veilpiercing standards for foreign entities fit comfortably in the
existing paradigm. Certainly they are within the domain of
intersecting foreign relations and foreign commerce interests, an
area in which the courts have occasionally asserted lawmaking
powers. Veil-piercing standards are historically judge-made and
fundamentally equitable, calling upon the unique skills of judges
to resolve fact-intensive disputes on a case-by-case basis
according to subjective notions of fairness. 2 21 They relate to
specific judicial functions, such as the power to determine who
the proper parties are in a dispute. It would be virtually
impossible for a legislature to craft a statute with sufficient
detail to address all relevant factors, and any such statute would
require frequent revision and amendment. Thus, federal judges
are in the best position to craft effective entity law standards
attuned to national governmental interests.
A.

CurrentFederal Common-Law Veil-PiercingStandards

In our federal system, corporate law is state law. 2 22 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that corporate law is
uniquely the province of the states: It is "an accepted part of the
business landscape in this country for States to create
corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights
that are acquired by purchasing their shares."223 Since Anderson
v. Abbott was decided in 1944, however, controversy has brewed
over the authority of the federal courts to develop federal veilpiercing standards in connection with federal statutes.
In
discussion infra Part V.C.2.
Although in "certain areas" federal legislation authorizes the federal courts to
fashion a complete body of federal law, corporate law "is not such an area." Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979); cf. Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 107 (1945).
223 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,
91 (1987).
221 See
222
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Anderson, the Supreme Court pierced the veil of a Delaware
corporation on the basis of federal law, holding that "no State
may endow its corporate creatures with the power to place
themselves above the Congress of the United States and defeat"
federal policy.22 4 Since Anderson, many federal courts have
articulated veil-piercing standards in connection with various
federal statutes. In 1982, an influential note in the HarvardLaw
Review described "chaos" in the choice-of-law regime for veil
piercing in connection with federal statutes, and that chaos
largely remains.22 5
Federal common-law veil-piercing standards exist in
connection with the following statutes: the Packers and
Stockyards Act,226 the Sherman Act, 227 the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 228 the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
("FSIA"),2 29 and federal labor laws, including ERISA,23 0 the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988,231
COBRA232 , and the Railway Labor Act.233 In addition, courts
have applied federal veil-piercing standards to determine
See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944) ("[N]o State may endow its
corporate creatures with the power to place themselves above the Congress of the
United States and defeat the federal policy concerning national banks which
Congress has announced."); see also Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.
173, 176 (1942) ("When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful the extent
and nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute
to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which
are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy which it has adopted.").
225 See Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under
FederalCommon Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 859 (1982).
226 See 7 U.S.C. § 209 (2006).
227 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
224

679, 688 (1978).

228 See, e.g., Kaufman v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles
et Commerciales, S.A., 343 U.S. 156, 159. (1952); Clark v. Uebersee FinanzKorporation, A.G., 332 U.S. 480, 486 (1947).
229 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (2006).
20 See, e.g., Sigmon v. Recovery Equity Investors, L.P. (In re Shelby Yarn Co.),
306 B.R. 523, 537 (W.D.N.C. 2004).
211 See, e.g., Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 495-96 (3d Cir.
2001); Sigmon, 306 B.R. at 537.
232 See, e.g., Mandeville v. Quinstar Corp., 109 F. App'x. 191 (10th Cir. 2004);
Shuck v. Wichita Hockey, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1194 (D. Kan. 2005) (applying
a federal standard to determine whether to pierce the corporate veil for a claim of
COBRA liability); Sigmon, 306 B.R. at 537.
233 See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18,
26 (1st Cir. 2000).
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whether to impose on shareholders liability for monetary claims
and civil fines under Medicare 23 4 and the Safe Drinking Water
Act.235 In 1998, the Supreme Court noted, but did not resolve,
"significant disagreement" among courts and commentators
about whether a federal common-law veil-piercing standard
should be applied in cases brought under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA").2 36 The Supreme Court has never repudiated
the authority of the federal courts to articulate federal, commonlaw veil-piercing standards in service to federal legislation,2 37
and, thus, where there is federal law, there exists a potential
delegation of entity-lawmaking authority to the federal courts.
The Supreme Court has required only the finest thread of
connection between federal law and judge-made entity law. In
FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de

Cuba , the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the
plaintiff, an American bank, could set off the value of assets
seized from it by the Cuban Government against a claim by a
Cuban bank on a letter of credit.2 38 The Cuban bank was whollyowned by the Cuban Government, 239 but it was a separate
juridical entity under Cuban law.240 In determining whether the
set-off was proper, the Supreme Court was required to determine
the contours of Bancec's juridical existence; if Bancec was a legal
entity separate from its owner, there could be no set-off. At its
essence, Bancec was a traditional veil-piercing case.
234 See United States v. Bridle Path Enters., Inc., No. Civ.A 99-11051-GAO, 2001
WL 1688911, at *2-3 (D. Mass Dec. 4, 2001) (applying a federal standard to
determine whether to pierce the corporate veil to satisfy a monetary claim under
Medicare).
"' See United States v. Dakota Wings Corp., No. 04-4002-KES, 2005 WL
2218881, at *2 (D.S.D. Sept. 12, 2005).
236 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9 (1998).
.. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has said that the presumption in favor
of separate corporate identity ends when treating the corporate entity as a separate
legal "person" will do "violence to the [federal] legislative purpose." Schenley
Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946).
238 462 U.S. 611, 613 (1983). An earlier case involving the same named parties:
FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
239 There was disagreement between the district court and the court of appeals
about Bancec's status as a wholly-owned instrumentality of the Cuban Government,
but the Supreme Court found that the Cuban Government supplied all of Bancec's
capital, owned all of its stock, and received all of its profits. See id. at 613-14.
240

Id. at 613.
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The defendant, Bancec, argued that the law of Cuba, the
chartering state, governed its juridical status. 241 The Supreme
Court declined to apply Cuban law, noting that Bancec's legal
status, which involved "the rights of third parties external to the
corporation," did not fall within the scope of the internal affairs
doctrine.24 2
The Court was thus left to decide the case under
international law, as Bancec urged in the alternative, or under
federal common law, which the plaintiff argued was
controlling.2 43 The Court attempted to side-step the choice-of-law
issue, writing that "the principles governing this case are
common to both international law and federal common law,
which in these circumstances is necessarily informed both by
international law principles and by articulated congressional
policies."24 4 Later in its opinion, the Court identified the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act2 45 as the source of the "articulated
congressional policies," although the Act, which is purely
jurisdictional, was irrelevant to the substance of the case.2 46
The Supreme Court resolved the dispute by creating a new
veil-piercing standard: The presumption in favor of the foreign
bank's separate legal status could be "overcome" where adhering
"blindly" to the corporate form would cause an "injustice."24 7 In
devising this rule, the Court cited with approval several post-Erie
precedents that applied " 'the broader equitable principle that the
doctrine of corporate entity, recognized generally and for most
purposes, will not be regarded when to do so would work fraud or
injustice.' "248 Bancec thus expanded the federal common law to
include equitable veil-piercing law, at least in questions involving
a foreign business entity wholly-owned by a foreign government.

Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 621. See supra Part II(A)(1) regarding the Internal Affairs Doctrine and
veil-piercing.
243 462 U.S. at 622.
241

242

2

Id. at 623.

245

28 U.S.C.

241

Id. at 627.

241 Id.
248 See

(1939)).

§§ 1602-11.

at 628, 632.
id. at 628-30 (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322
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The Supreme Court's constitutional authority to make this
federal common law has not been challenged by legal scholars,
nor repudiated by Congress.
Bancec is particularly noteworthy because of the strained
connection between the federal statute that served to authorize
federal common law-the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Actand the substance of the federal common law that was made-an
The Foreign Sovereign
equitable veil-piercing standard.
Immunities Act is a jurisdictional statute. It does not address
any substantive law issue, and in Bancec it was actually
irrelevant to the outcome of the case.2 49 Yet the Court took the
position that the defendant's qualification for a special, but
irrelevant, jurisdictional status under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act authorized federal common law that addressed
the substance of the case.o50 By analogy, then, the Supreme
Court might just as easily conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1),
which states that a corporation is a citizen of the U.S. state in
which it has its "principal place of business," authorizes federal
common law veil piercing in a legal dispute involving a foreign
corporation to which this jurisdictional rule applies; that is, one
with a principal place of business inside the United States.
In fact, in the years since Bancec was decided in 1983, the
Supreme Court has clarified that a foreign government need not
own all of a foreign entity's shares for the foreign entity to
qualify as an "instrumentality of a foreign government" under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.25 ' In practice, the federal
courts now apply the "articulated congressional policies" of the
FSIA to entities with less than a majority of direct foreign
government ownership.2 52
Thus, logically, the Bancec veil249 The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in its opinion, noting that "ft]he
language and history of the FSIA clearly establish that the Act was not intended to
affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or
instrumentality, or the attribution of liability among instrumentalities of a foreign
state." Id. at 620.
..
0 See id. at 627-32.

See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003).
See, e.g., Cal. Dep't of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.
2008) (FSIA instrumentality status satisfied by an entity indirectly owned by the
Canadian government); United Arab Shipping Co. v. Eagle Sys., Inc., No. CV408067, 2008 WL 4087121 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 2, 2008) (FSIA instrumentality status
satisfied by an entity with pooled ownership interests of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Iraq).
251
252
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piercing standard would apply today to foreign entities with
partial, or indirect, foreign government ownership.2 53 There are
radically different principles at stake in granting an entity
sovereign immunity in our courts-cutting off liability
completely-versus piercing the entity's corporate veil, and
thereby shifting liability, and therefore no reason to believe that
the contours of the two doctrines should be coterminous, or that
Congress intended the two doctrines to be coterminous. In other
words, today, the federal common law veil-piercing standard
articulated in Bancec could be applied to a foreign entity with a
small or attenuated foreign government ownership interest while
remaining true to the congressional policies, as well as to the
foreign relations and foreign commerce interests, that animated
the Bancec decision.
The current existence of federal common law veil-piercing
standards is significant for two reasons. First, it shows that the
federal courts are frequently challenged by cases that require
equitable veil-piercing analysis, where the source of the veilpiercing law is not clear. In these cases, the court's obligation to
decide the dispute is in tension with its responsibility to avoid
"transcendental" standards.2 5 4 The fact that federal courts have
often resolved these tensions by creating federal veil-piercing
standards-at a time when federal common law has been
condemned by judicial and academic criticism-proves that
federal common law veil piercing standards are both necessary
and appropriate sometimes, and perhaps uniquely so. Second,
the weak delegation "hook" in many instances of federal common
253 This Article does not imply that Bancec identified FSIA "instrumentality"
status as a prerequisite for the federal common law veil-piercing standard to apply.
It did not. It thus remains an open question whether the Supreme Court would
apply a federal common law veil-piercing standard to a foreign entity with foreign
government ownership that fell short of the FSIA standard. Given the Supreme
Court's established reluctance to apply the foreign jurisdiction's law, and the
inappropriateness of applying parochial state law, it is likely that the Supreme
Court would apply the federal common law veil-piercing standard articulated in
Bancec to an entity indirectly owned by a foreign government, or one with a small
but controlling interest of a foreign government.
254 Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). Ironically, the governing
principles identified by the Supreme Court in Bancec, "common to both international
law and federal common law, which in these circumstances is necessarily informed
both by international law principles and by articulated congressional policies," sound
a lot like "transcendental" law.
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law veil-piercing shows that a strong delegation is not necessary.
These precedents suggest that if equitable veil-piercing
principles can be harmonized with "articulated Congressional
policies" in substantively unrelated laws, federal veil-piercing
rules are proper.
B.

The Treaties that Govern the JuridicalStatus of Foreign
Firms

Many foreign entity law issues are framed by federal law:
bilateral treaties that address the juridical status of corporations
chartered by specific nations. These treaties typically command
the courts to recognize foreign corporations as litigants-even as
parties with limited liability-and some contemplate a more
significant role for the federal courts in policing the foreign
corporate form by, for example, rejecting separate juridical status.
for a corporation whose charter is contrary to American public
policy. Treaties, of course, are federal law, and these entity law
provisions supersede state entity laws as applied to corporations
chartered by the relevant treaty partners.25 5
The United States is party to more than a dozen bilateral
treaties 256 that contain language to the effect that companies
"constituted under the applicable laws and regulations" of the
treaty partner "shall have their juridical status recognized"
within the United States. 2 57 Nations with which the United
States has signed such treaties include Belgium,25 8 Denmark,25 9
France,2 60 Japan, 2 6 Korea,262 Luxembourg,6 the Netherlands,26 4
215 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979) ("Legal rules which impact
significantly upon the effectuation of federal rights must. . . be treated as raising
federal questions.").
256 See infra notes 257-70 and accompanying text.
257 See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights, U.S.Iran, art. III 1 1, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899.
25" Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, U.S.-Belg., Feb. 21,
1961, 14 U.S.T. 1284 [hereinafter U.S-Belgian Treaty].
259 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Den., Oct. 1, 1951, 12
U.S.T. 908.
260 Convention of Establishment, U.S.-Fr., Nov. 25, 1959, 11 U.S.T. 2398.
21' Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation , U.S.-Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, 4
U.S.T. 2063.
262 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Korea, Nov. 28, 1956,
8 U.S.T. 2217.
2'
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, U.S.-Lux., Feb. 23,
1962, 14 U.S.T. 251 [hereinafter U.S.-Luxembourg Treaty].
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Nicaragua, 26 5 Oman, 266 Pakistan, 26 7 Thailand, 26 8 Togo, 269 and
Vietnam.o Most of these treaties include provisions that require
each nation to recognize the juridical status of the other country's
companies "whether or not with limited liability," and provide
that such entities will have access to "courts of justice and
administrative tribunals" in each nation "in all degrees of
jurisdiction."271' None of the treaties selects a choice-of-law
approach for issues relating to the internal affairs or juridical
status of covered companies.
Thus, the treaties direct the federal courts to open their
doors to companies that are created by specific foreign sovereigns
and acknowledge that some of-the companies may possess limited
liability. But they provide incomplete or ambiguous direction to
the courts about what standards to apply. They do not guide the
courts in enforcing the companies' limited liability, other than to
specify that the entities' access to American courts "shall be
allowed upon terms no less favorable than those applicable to
nationals and companies of [the United States] or of any third

264 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Neth., Mar. 27, 1956,
8 U.S.T. 2043.
265 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Nicar., Jan. 21, 1956,
9 U.S.T. 449.
266 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, U.S.-Muscat &
Oman and Dependencies, Dec. 20, 1958, 11 U.S.T. 1835.
267 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, U.S.-Pak., Nov. 12, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 110.
Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, U.S.-Thai., May 29, 1966, 19 U.S.T.
2
5843 [hereinafter U.S.-Thailand Treaty].
269 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, U.S.-Togo, Feb. 8, 1966, 18 U.S.T.
1.
270 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, U.S.-Viet., April 3, 1961, 12 U.S.T.
1703.
27 See, e.g., U.S.-Belgian Treaty, supra note 258, 14 U.S.T. at 1288, 1306.
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country," 27 2 and to prohibit each nation from discriminating
against the rights and interests of companies of the other
nation.2 73
The treaties typically specify that courts should recognize
companies' juridical status provided that "nothing in their
charter or corporate purposes is contrary to the public policy of
such other Party."2 74 A 1932 treaty signed with Norway specifies
that:
Limited liability and other corporations and associations,
whether or not for pecuniary profit, which have been or may
hereafter be organized in accordance with and under the laws,
National, State or Provincial, of either High Contracting Party
and maintain a central office within the territories thereof, shall
have their juridical status recognized by the other High
Contracting Party provided that they pursue no aims within its
territories contrary to its laws.275
Such provisions are important because, by necessity, they
contemplate that the courts will assess a foreign corporation's
charter provisions, corporate purposes, or operations to
determine if they are contrary to American public policy or law.
In fact, as written, these treaties would require a court to
disregard the corporate form of an entity that contravened
American public policy-or, in the case of Norway, American

272 See, e.g., U.S.-Thailand Treaty, supra note 268, 19 U.S.T. at 5846 ("Nationals
and companies of either Party shall have free access to courts of justice and
administrative agencies within the territories of the other Party, in all degrees of
jurisdiction, both in the defense and in the pursuit of their rights. Such access shall
be allowed upon terms no less favorable than those applicable to nationals and
companies of such other Party or of any third country, including the terms
applicable to requirements for deposit of security. It is understood that companies
not engaged in activities within the country shall enjoy the right of such access
without any requirement of registration or domestication.").
27 See, e.g., U.S-Belgian Treaty, supra note 258, 14 U.S.T. at 1291 ("Neither
party shall take unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would impair the
acquired rights and interests within its territories of nationals and companies of the
other Party in the enterprises which they have established .....
274 U.S.-Belgian Treaty, supra note 258, 14 U.S.T.
at 1293.
275Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights and Exchange of
Notes Concerning the Tariff Treatment of Norwegian Sardines, U.S.-Nor., art. XII,
Feb. 25, 1929, 47 Stat. 2135 [hereinafter U.S.-Nor. Treaty]. A treaty with Liberia,
signed several years later, contains the same essential language. See Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Liber., art. XVII, Aug. 8, 1938, 54 Stat.
1739, T.S. No. 956.
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law. 216 In other words, these treaties contemplate an active role
for the courts in policing the corporate form of foreign entities
and command the disregard of their corporate form in certain
They federalize the juridical status of covered
situations.
companies, and thus render the disregard of that juridical status
a matter of federal law.
Some of the treaties also allow each nation to deny the
advantages of the treaty to companies directly or indirectly
controlled by nationals of any third country, an act that would
require the disregard of the corporate form of the foreign
corporation to accomplish.2 7 7 Thus, a federal agency could
conclude that a Thai corporation was indirectly controlled by
nationals of a hostile nation and deny the Thai corporation the
benefits of the Thailand-United States Treaty. If the Thai
corporation sued to enforce the Treaty, the federal court would
have to identify a control standard and apply it by disregarding
the corporate veil of the Thai corporation to evaluate the nature
of its ownership. This, again, authorizes federal, judge-made
veil-piercing standards.
The current choice-of-entity-law regime violates the
provisions in these treaties that require foreign corporations'
access to American courts on terms "no less favorable" than those
applicable to American or other foreign corporations, as well as
the provisions that prohibit each nation from discriminating
against the rights and interests of companies of the other
A state's veil-piercing standard may over- or
nation.27 8
undervalue factors that are prevalent or absent in the corporate
U.S.-Nor. Treaty, supra note 275, 47 Stat. at art. XII.
See, e.g., U.S.-Thailand Treaty, supra note 268, 19 U.S.T. at 5857-58. Article
XII of the treaty also addresses juridical personhood:
The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures ... (f)
denying to any company in the ownership or direction of which nationals of
any third country or countries have directly or indirectly the controlling
interest, the advantages of the present Treaty, except with respect to
recognition of juridical status and with respect to access to courts of justice
and to administrative tribunals and agencies.
Id.
*27See, e.g., U.S.-Luxembourg Treaty, supra note 263, 14 U.S.T. at 261
("National treatment accorded under the provisions of the present Treaty to
companies of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg shall, in any State or possession of
the United States of America, be the treatment accorded therein to companies
created or organized in other States and possessions of the United States of
America.")
276
277
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law practices of a particular nation, thereby effectively
discriminating against corporations on the basis of their national
origin. And the lack of a unified approach serves to favor
domestic corporations over foreign ones because domestic firms
will be subject only to the entity law of a single jurisdiction, the
one in which they were incorporated, while foreign firms are
potentially subject to the laws of all fifty states. Thus, in a broad
sense, the double standard of the choice-of-law regime itself is
discriminatory. The federal government has an interest in
changing the regime to comply with our treaty obligations and to
facilitate international commerce.
C.

ConstitutionalConsiderations

There exists a significant debate in the legal academy about
the authority of the federal courts to make common law .279 A
number of scholars and judges take the view that federal judges
have a very narrow power to craft common law, and thus most
forms of federal common law are illegitimate.so Yet federal
common law continues to exist and develop, particularly in
certain areas, and the Supreme Court has been careful to
preserve its common-law-making ability.2 81
The question of whether federal courts should craft commonlaw veil-piercing standards for foreign entities directly implicates
this debate. Assuming that the commercial treaties described
above constitute a delegation of substantive lawmaking power to
the federal courts, where is the delegation of lawmaking power to
be found for firms created by governments that have not signed
such treaties with the United States? This Section argues that
See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1248-51 (1996); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 740-41 (2010); Louise
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805-06 (1989); Ernest A.
Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 164041 (2008).
280 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 740-43 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Clark, supra note 279; Weinberg, supra note 279, at 806.
281 See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23, 27-28 (2004) (creating
"decisional law for the interpretation of maritime contracts"); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 72930 (concluding that the "door is still ajar" to "further independent judicial
recognition of actionable international norms"); Monaghan, supra note 279, at 75960 ("[F]ar more federal common law exists than the currently restrictive theories can
account for. . . .").
279
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the delegation derives from constitutional sources, including
the constitution's commitment of matters relating to foreign
commerce and foreign relations to the federal government, and
from certain structural imperatives, including the important
need to preserve and consolidate national lawmaking power
where state law would be limited, weak, or compromised in ways
that federal law would not. In short, when all the interests are
weighed, this is a context in which federal judge-made law is
constitutionally authorized.
Uniformity, Economic Efficiency, and the Foreign Commerce
Power
"Foreign commerce is pre-eminently a matter of national
concern." 28 The Commerce Clause gives to Congress the power
Itilo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes,"2 83 and the Supreme
Court has suggested that "a more extensive constitutional
inquiry is required" under the foreign commerce power than
under the interstate commerce power to prevent state
encroachment.2 84 The regulation of business organizations is
today one of the most powerful tools for regulating commerce,
since most commerce involves the participation of at least one
business organization. Thus, issues concerning the juridical
status of foreign corporations and other commercial entities are
significant matters of foreign commerce that go to the heart of
these entities' ability to make contracts, own property, and
enforce contractual, property, and other rights in court. In a
sense, the law that defines foreign entities' juridical status
defines foreign commerce itself.
Although the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to
regulate foreign commerce, it, like the foreign relations power,
has been held to possess a dormant power that displaces state
law. In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,28 5 the
Supreme Court established the dormant foreign Commerce
1.

28 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979); cf. Cooley v. Bd. of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (matters that "are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of
such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress").
283 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
284 JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 446.
2 5 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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Clause power when it invalidated a California state tax that
applied to shipping companies incorporated under the laws of
Japan, citing the long-standing doctrine that, in matters of
foreign commerce, constitutional design required "the people of
the United States [to] act through a single government with
unified and adequate national power. "286 The adequacy of the
national power-the adequacy of the power of the federal
judiciary-is assumed to exist in such matters by constitutional
design.
Japan Line emphasized a national interest in uniformity of
approach to matters of foreign commerce, and the issue of
uniformity has arisen several times in the context of taxation of
business entities operating transnationally.2 87 Tax matters, of
course, involve overlapping state and federal interests; a single
foreign entity can be taxed by both a state and the federal
government.2 8 8 With issues of corporate form, however, only one
government's law can provide the veil-piercing standard in a
Moreover, as we have seen, economic
particular dispute.
efficiency requires the certainty and predictability that is best
achieved by a uniform standard. Both the nature of veil piercing
itself, as well as the federal interest in promoting economic
efficiency, augur in favor of a uniform approach as much as
possible. Although the concern for uniformity in matters of
international dimension-the so-called "one-voice" test-has been
limited by language in subsequent Supreme Court decisions,2 8 9
entity law presents a particularly strong case for uniformity of
approach.
Thus, the application of one state's parochial entity law
standard to a foreign firm represents a threat to important
federal interests. Congress, of course, can authorize the states to
take action that would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause,2"o
286 Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933); see
also Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875) (regulation must be
"national in its character" when it concerns "a subject which concerns our
international relations, in regard to which foreign nations ought to be considered
and their rights respected").
287 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 320-23
(1994); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430-31 (1946).
2
289

Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 317-19.
See, e.g., id. at 320-31 (1994).

290 See Prudential Ins. Co., 328 U.S. at 429-36; Gillian E. Metzger, Congress,
Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1480-85 (2007)
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but that is not the case here and, in fact, where Congress has
expressly delegated authority to the courts to pierce the
corporate veil of foreign entities-as it has in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act 2 9 1-it has delegated the authority to
the federal courts. If state veil-piercing standards are to apply to
foreign entities-in fact, different state standards depending on
the circumstances-the Congressional authorization for such a
patchwork scheme should be explicit, not implied by that body's
silence. Japan Line established that in a matter concerning
foreign commerce in which Congress has remained silent, the
Supreme Court serves as "the final arbiter of the competing
demands of state and national interests."29 2 That is, in matters of
foreign commerce, the federal judiciary possesses the power to
displace state law.
The Dormant Foreign Relations Power
In 2002, the Supreme Court held that a judicial decision
excluding corporations organized under the laws of the British
Virgin Islands from the definition of "citizens or subjects of a
foreign state" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction "implicate[d]
serious issues of foreign relations." 29 3 The Court expressed
concern that "expulsion" of British Virgin Islands corporations
from the United States federal courts "would cloud investment
opportunity and raise the sort of threat to 'the security of the
public tranquility' that the Framers hoped to avoid."294 The
Supreme Court's view that a foreign corporation's access to the
courts of the United States was a matter of foreign relations was
certainly correct, and the governments of the United States and
the United Kingdom both submitted amicus curiae briefs that
affirmed it.2 95 The understanding that the federal courts' role in
2.

(concluding that Congress's power to authorize such state action "follows from
respecting Congress's constitutionally allocated powers as well as from structural
differences between Congress and the states").
291

292

28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2006).
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 454 (1979) (quoting S. Pac. Co.

v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)).
293 JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S.
88, 91 (2002).
294 Id. at 97.
295 Brief of the Government of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, JPMorgan Chase Bank
v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88 (2002) (No. 01-651), 2002
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matters of foreign commerce vitally affects United States foreign
affairs was shared by the Framers. 296 And the fact that bilateral
treaties address the juridical status of foreign corporations, and
that some nations have created corporations by treaty,
demonstrates that such issues are widely held to be a proper
subject for international diplomacy.
Legal scholars agree that our Constitution commits matters
that are important to United States foreign relations to the
federal government. 297 Naturally, not all matters that infringe on
foreign relations must be governed by federal law; a state may
tax a foreign corporation, for example, or fine it for a violation of

WL 257562, at *2-3; Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536
U.S. 88 (2002) (No. 01-651), 2002 WL 316661, at *20, 23.
296 Three events during or immediately following the Revolutionary War
convinced the Framers that a federal judiciary was necessary to adjudicate
international commercial disputes, which they viewed as vitally important to
American foreign affairs and thus properly subject to federal power. The first event
was the creation of the nation's first federal court, the Court of Appeals in cases of
capture, which adjudicated what were essentially commercial disputes over the
disposition of maritime seizures of enemy vessels during the Revolution. See
generally HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1775-1787 (1977). The
second was the Longehamps Affair, in which Congress found that it was unable to
control the exercise of jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts in a diplomatic crisis
that involved an assault on a French commercial minister. The Longchamps Affair
also forced Congress to confront its inability to influence state court interpretations
of the law of nations, a politically unpopular body of international law that governed
diplomatic and commercial relations between nations. The Longchamps Affair and
its significance are ably documented in two articles by G.S. Rowe and Alexander W.
Knott. G.S. Rowe & Alexander W. Knott, Power, Justice, and Foreign Relations in
the Confederation Period: The Marbois-Longchamps Affair, 1784-1786, 104 PENN.
MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 275 (1980); G.S. Rowe & Alexander W. Knott, The
Longchamps Affair (1784-86), the Law of Nations, and the Shaping of Early
American Foreign Policy, 10 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 199, 214 (1986) ("Congressmen were
extremely sensitive to their impotence in foreign affairs and their inability to
persuade the thirteen states to follow their lead."). The third was Congress's failure
to persuade state legislatures and courts to enforce provisions of the Jay Treaty that
were intended to facilitate the recovery of American debts by British creditors. See
Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1461.
297See, e.g., Drew Tedford, Silent No More: The Logan Act as a Constitutionally
Enforceable Tool in Foreign Policy, 33 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 733, 738 (2010) ("[It is
generally accepted that the Constitution does confer exclusive power over foreign
affairs to the federal government rather than individuals or states.").
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state law.298 But a "dormant" foreign relations power operates to
prevent the states from infringing on the federal government's
key role in foreign affairs. Two cases, Banco Nacionalde Cuba v.
2 99 and Zschernig v. Miller, 00 form the basis of the
Sabbatino
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court adopted the act of state
doctrine as federal common law and applied it as the basis to
decline to review the validity of an act of the Cuban government
under customary international law. 01 The act of state doctrine,
which originated in English law and was endorsed in American
Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to Erie, had no source in the
Constitution or an act of Congress. 3 02 Sabbatino had arisen
under diversity jurisdiction, and thus the Court was obliged,
under Erie, to apply state law.3 03 The Court expressly noted that
the outcome under New York and federal law regarding the act of
state doctrine was essentially the same. 304 Nonetheless, the
Court proceeded to hold that "an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary
and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with
other members of the international community must be treated
exclusively as an aspect of federal law." 3 05 The Court then
elaborated the federal common law act of state doctrine by
explaining that no exception to the act of state doctrine existed
for acts of state that violated international law.306

298 See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S.
298, 330-31 (1994) (holding that California's method of calculating taxes on foreign
corporations does not violate Due Process or Commerce Clauses).
299 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
300 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
301

Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426.

302

Id. at 416, 423.

303
304

Id. at 424-25.

Id. at 425.
Id. In a footnote, the Court added, "[alt least this is true when the Court
limits the scope of judicial inquiry." Id. at 425 n.23. The Court further explained,
"[W]e need not now consider whether a state court might, in certain circumstances,
adhere to a more restrictive view concerning the scope of examination of foreign acts
than that required by this Court." Id.
3
Id. at 430-3 1.
305
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The Sabbatino Court found constitutional and statutory law
in "indirect" support of its holding that the act of state doctrine
was a matter of federal common law.3 07 The thrust of these laws,
the Court wrote, reflected "a concern for uniformity in this
country's dealings with foreign nations and indicating a desire to
give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of
federal institutions."3 08 The Supreme Court identified itself as
the federal institution with the power to supervise the country's
judicial dealings with foreign nations and, thus, the proper
source of the doctrine.3 09
In Zschernig, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon
statute that had denied inheritance to the East German heirs of
an Oregon resident.3 10 The statute placed the burden on the
heirs to establish that East Germany provided reciprocal
inheritance rights to United States citizens, and that the East
German government would not confiscate the inheritance.3 "' The
United States government submitted an amicus curiae brief in
the case contending that the Oregon statute did not "unduly
interfere" with the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, but the
Court nonetheless held that the statutory provision was "an
intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress."312
Legal scholars have been quick to eulogize the Zschernig
doctrine.3 13 Yet even a restrictive reading of Sabbatino and
Zschernig supports the displacement of a state, judge-made
standard by a federal, judge-made standard in an area of lawlike veil piercing-that, by long tradition, is exclusively judgemade, and that impacts our relationships with virtually every
nation on the globe. The question is not whether federal, judgemade entity law standards can properly supersede laws crafted
by state legislatures through democratic processes, but whether
30' Id. at 427 n.25. The Court cited U.S. CONST., art, I, § 8, cis. 3, 10; U.S. CONST.
art. II, §§ 2, 3; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(3),
1332(a)(2), 1333, 1350, 1351.
308 Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 427 n.25.
30o Id. at 427-28.
310 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41
(1968).

11 Id. at 430-31.

312Id. at 432, 434.
313 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815, 865 (1997).
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national judge-made standards are more likely than state judgemade standards to strike a balance in our national interest. The
answer must be that they are.
The shadow of the dormant foreign relations power is
particularly strong where, as here, the imposition of any state
law serves to tie the hands of federal institutions and to limit the
power of the federal government to craft laws that serve our
national interests. The states, as we have seen, are prohibited by
the Dormant Commerce Clause from discriminating against outof-state business entities operating in interstate or foreign
commerce. In a choice-of-law regime in which state entity law
governs, all foreign entities are equal, and foreign and domestic
entities are equal. Thus the President has nothing to bargain
when the United States negotiates commercial treaty provisions
on the subject with foreign nations; the Dormant Commerce
Clause has secured for all foreign entities-including,
presumably, those chartered by nations with whom we have
hostile relations-and without any meaningful democratic
debate, the most-favored-nation status that is reflected in the
bilateral commercial treaties discussed in Section B above.
One can easily imagine circumstances in which the national
interest might be served by treating the juridical status of
American firms differently from the juridical status of some
kinds of entities chartered abroad. One example, involving a
specific type of corporation chartered by Bermuda, has arisen
already. 314 Bermuda, like several Caribbean nations, charters a
category of "exempt" business corporations that are expressly
prohibited from conducting business with the nation's own
residents and corporations.3 15 In two cases involving veil-piercing
claims against Bermuda "exempt" corporations, federal courts in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have held that this
prohibition affects the veil-piercing choice-of-law inquiry. One
district court, applying New York choice-of-law, held that a
...In addition to the example in the text, two other ideas come easily to mind.
First, one-person corporations chartered abroad by American citizens might be
treated differently, particularly if they operate exclusively in the United States.
Second, it might make sense to create different veil-piercing standards for widelyheld, closely-held, and one-person corporations organized under the laws of nations
that distinguish among these categories.
s' See, e.g., Bermuda Offshore Company Information, OCRAWORLDWIDE,
http://www.ocra.conVjurisdictions/bermuda.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
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Bermuda entity's status as an "exempt" corporation "greatly
diminished" Bermuda's interest in governing the veil-piercing
analysis, and factored this into its decision to apply New York
veil-piercing law to the Bermuda company. 316 An earlier case
came to a similar conclusion and applied Pennsylvania law."
Yet it is clear that the American interests at stake in these
cases are national interests, not merely the interests of
Pennsylvania, and that the interference of Pennsylvanian
institutions in such matters threatens national interests.31 8 The
fact that federal courts were forced to balance national interests
by invoking state law further underscores how convoluted the
veil-piercing choice-of-law regime for foreign entities has become.
If Bermudan corporate law is to be singled out for disfavored
treatment by American courts-perhaps with good reason-the
decision should be made by national governmental institutions,
not by the courts of Pennsylvania.
Consolidating the power to fashion entity law standards in
the federal judiciary will solve this problem while retaining
supervisory power for Congress. Although many legal scholars
are avowedly critical of lawmaking by federal judges, veil
piercing is an area in which such lawmaking makes sense.
Historically and by practical necessity, veil-piercing standards
Veil-piercing claims involve fact-intensive
are judge-made.
disputes that are best resolved by judges on a case-by-case basis,
using equitable principles of fairness, and exercising a
fundamental judicial power to determine who the proper parties
are in a dispute. No American legislature has successfully
crafted a statute with sufficient detail to define all the
circumstances under which the corporate form should be
disregarded. The balance of power over laws integrating foreign

316 Curiale v. Tiber Holding Corp., No. CIV. A. 95-5284, 1997 WL 713950, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1997).
317 See Foster v. Berwind Corp., No. 90-0857, 1991 WL 21666,
at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 13, 1991).
31 Cf. Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, No. 09-21597-Civ., 2010 WL 2812565, at *7
(S.D. Fla. July 5, 2010) ("Florida and the United States as a whole have a significant
interest in ensuring that international corporations do not engage in fraudulent
conduct within our jurisdiction so as to shield themselves from liability.") In fact,
these decisions probably violate the Commerce Clause as well as the dormant
foreign relations power under Zschernig.
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entities into our legal system should be shifted from state
legislatures and courts to federal legislatures and courts, with
federal courts expanding their current role.
Federal law offers the best solution to the complex choice-oflaw problem this Article has explored. The application of
uniform entity-law standards to all foreign firms in most
circumstanceS 319 will end the unfair, economically inefficient
approach that now exists, and which possibly violates foreign
firms' due process rights and some American treaty obligations.
It will obviate practical problems, such as the need to ascertain
foreign nations' laws, the unique concerns raised by treatychartered entities, and the complex challenges posed by
pyramidal ownership arrangements or corporate groups that
span numerous foreign jurisdictions. Perhaps most importantly,
it will vest lawmaking authority in governmental institutions
with a full scope of lawmaking power, and with a constitutional
grant of authority over the intersecting domains of foreign
commerce and foreign relations. For all these reasons, clear
federal interests are at stake in the choice-of-law debate, and the
fact that the federal courts already create and apply federal
common-law veil-piercing standards strengthens the case for
federal common law in this area of law.
Since federal entity law standards for foreign firms would
create a break from precedent, however, and would be
controversial in the debate over federal common law, Congress
could resolve the matter by enacting legislation that grants
explicit authority for judge-made veil-piercing standards for
foreign companies. Although such legislation is not necessary for
the creation of federal common-law veil-piercing standards for
foreign firms, it would reflect the benefits of the democratic
process and provide clear direction to the federal courts.

a 9 One type of veil-piercing that may not be appropriate for federal common-law
standards is jurisdictional veil-piercing where either a state or a federal court must
apply state jurisdictional law. Although a full exploration of this issue is not possible
here, an argument could be made that each state should have the power to define its
own long-arm jurisdiction, within constitutional parameters.
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CONCLUSION

This Article has identified a choice-of-law double standard of
great significance in our increasingly global economy: American
courts apply different choice-of-law rules to domestic and foreign
firms when deciding whether to disregard the corporate form.
The existence of the double standard itself is problematic. It
suggests that courts are imposing agency costs on foreign firms
that are not imposed on domestic firms, thus hindering
international commerce. It also suggests that the United States
is violating certain bilateral treaties that prohibit discrimination
against the rights and interests of covered foreign companies.
And it means that the federal government has improperly ceded
matters of national importance-matters committed by the
constitution to federal institutions-to the states. Importantly, it
reveals that courts do not agree about the basic assumptions that
underlie veil-piercing choice-of-law, a fact that should lead us to
rethink those assumptions.
Courts in all states generally hew to a choice-of-law rule that
calls for the application of the law of the chartering jurisdiction
to domestic firms. These same courts typically do not apply this
rule to foreign firms. They either engage in a choice-of-law
analysis that balances governmental interests, or they simply
acquiesce in the agreement of the parties as to choice of law. In
either case, the court typically applies the law of an American
state to a company chartered abroad. In only a minority of cases
have courts applied the law of the foreign chartering jurisdiction,
often to find that the foreign law does not "recognize" Americanstyle, equitable veil-piercing.
This Article has shown that the choice between state and
foreign veil-piercing law is a false choice. The correct choice of
law is federal law. Questions about the juridical status of foreign
firms are a matter of federal law because bilateral treaties have
"federalized" companies' juridical statuses, at least for covered
nations. And the foreign relations and foreign commerce powers
both should be understood to commit questions about the
juridical status of foreign firms to the federal government.
The juridical status of foreign business organizations should
be governed by uniform federal standards, fashioned by federal
judges with national interests in mind. The dormant foreign
relations and dormant foreign commerce powers prohibit a

1010

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:925

patchwork of state laws from controlling matters that are
important to United States foreign relations and foreign
The federal
commerce, in which uniformity is crucial.
government has the greatest interest in governing the juridical
status of foreign firms because it is not constrained by the
Dormant Commerce Clause to treat in-state and out-of-state
entities similarly, as the states are. The lawmaking flexibility of
federal institutions must be understood to trump the states'
ability to impose laws designed to protect local interests on
foreign firms.
The federal courts are the right institution to supervise the
juridical status of foreign entities, using the time-honored, caseby-case equitable analysis that veil piercing has always required.
Because the Constitution gives subject matter jurisdiction to the
federal courts in cases in which there is alienage diversity, the
federal courts can expect to adjudicate many disputes involving
foreign entities. But as this Article has emphasized, Congress
has the ultimate power to control the integration of foreign firms
into our system, and it should act to retain the authority of
federal institutions, and federal interests, over this important
area of law.

